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Two of the most well known regularities observed in preferences under risk and
uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behav-
ior of an agent who can display both tendencies simultaneously. We introduce
a novel notion of preference for hedging that applies to both objective lotteries
and uncertain acts. We show that this axiom, together with other standard ones,
is equivalent to a representation in which the agent (i) evaluates ambiguity using
multiple priors, as in the model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), and (ii) evalu-
ates objective lotteries by distorting probabilities, as in the rank dependent utility
model, but using the worst from a set of distortions. We show that a preference for
hedging is not sufficient to guarantee Ellsberg-like behavior if the agent violates
expected utility for objective lotteries; we provide a novel axiom that characterizes
this case, linking the distortions for objective and subjective bets.
Keywords. Ambiguity aversion, Allais paradox, Ellsberg paradox, hedging, mul-
tiple priors, subjective mixture, probability weighting, rank dependent utility.
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1. Introduction
Considerable empirical and theoretical work has been devoted to studying two classes
of paradoxes in individual decision making: (i) violations of von Neumann and Mor-
genstern’s expected utility for objective risk—most notably the Allais paradox—and
(ii) violations of (Savage) expected utility for subjective uncertainty—usually called un-
certainty (or ambiguity) aversion, as demonstrated by the Ellsberg paradox. These be-
haviors constitute two of the most widely studied and robust phenomena in experimen-
tal economics and the psychology of individual decision making. Two vast theoretical
literatures have emerged, each intended to generalize standard models to account for
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one of the two phenomena. Substantially less attention, however, has been devoted to
studying the relationship between the two or to the development of models that allow
both behaviors simultaneously. The vast majority of models designed to explain Allais-
like preferences consider only objective probabilities, whereas models that study uncer-
tainty aversion either do not consider objective probabilities (as in the setup of Savage
1954) or, if they do, explicitly assume that the agent follows expected utility to assess
them (as is typical in the setup of Anscombe and Aumann 1963).1
Despite these largely separate analyses, the idea of a connection between the two
classes of behavior has been informally present for decades: loosely speaking, a decision
maker (henceforth DM) who is “pessimistic” about the outcome of risky and uncertain
events may display both tendencies. This conceptual connection is coupled with a tech-
nical one: both phenomena can been considered violations of some form of linearity (or
independence with respect to probability mixtures) in the preferences of the agent. Re-
cent experimental evidence also suggests that the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes are em-
pirically linked: Dean and Ortoleva (2017) show that subjects who display one behavior
are significantly more likely to exhibit the other.
The goal of this paper is then threefold. First, we establish a conceptual link between
uncertainty aversion and Allais-type behavior by showing how to jointly characterize
the two using a novel axiom: a generalized notion of preference for hedging. Second,
we use this axiom to derive a representation that simultaneously captures pessimism
in the domains of risk and uncertainty. Third, we study the behavioral implications of
doing so—specifically the relationship between preference for hedging and ambiguity
aversion while allowing for non-expected utility behavior in objective lotteries.
Our main behavioral axiom is a generalized notion of hedging. Since Schmeidler
(1989), the concept of preference for hedging has been used to capture uncertainty aver-
sion by postulating that for any two acts between which she is indifferent, a DM prefers
the probability mixture of the two acts to the acts themselves. We extend this idea to cap-
ture pessimism over objective lotteries by replacing probability mixtures with outcome
mixtures in the style of Ghirardato et al. (2003): the outcome mixture of two outcomes is
a third outcome with a utility exactly halfway between those of the original two.2 We de-
fine the mixture of two lotteries p and q as the set of lotteries generated using outcome
mixtures considering all possible joint distributions of p and q. A mixture of two acts is
then defined pointwise.
Hedging states that for any three acts f , g, and h, if a DM is indifferent between f
and g, and h can be obtained as a mixture of f and g, then h must be weakly preferred to
both. When applied to lotteries, we argue that a pessimistic DM will exhibit a preference
for hedging because it reduces the variance of the utility of outcomes.3 When applied to
1Exceptions are Wakker (2001, 2010), Klibanoff et al. (2005), and Drapeau and Kupper (2013). We refer to
Section 4 for an analysis of the literature.
2For example, to mix $0 and $10 we look for a monetary amount that generates a utility halfway between
the utility of $0 and the utility of $10. If the utility is linear, this would be $5; less in case of diminishing
marginal utility.
3That is, a lottery r that is generated as a 50/50mixture betweenp and q will have expected utility halfway
between that of p and q, but a variance in utilities that is less than the average variance of p and q.
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acts, hedging reduces subjective uncertainty by mixing the outcomes that acts return in
each state (akin to the axiom in Schmeidler 1989).
We show that our generalized preference for hedging, along with other standard
axioms, characterizes a model that generalizes the maxmin expected utility (MMEU)
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to allow for Allais-style behavior. In this repre-
sentation, the DM evaluates acts as in MMEU: having evaluated the outcome of the act
in each state, she considers a set of priors  over the states of the world and takes expec-
tations using the worst of the priors in . This model differs from MMEU in that objec-
tive lotteries are not assessed using expected utility. Rather, the agent distorts probabili-
ties following a procedure similar to the rank dependent utility (RDU) model of Quiggin
(1982). Here, however, she considers a set of convex (pessimistic) probability distortions
and uses the worst one to evaluate the objective lottery. This is a strict generalization of
RDU with convex distortion. In Section 2.3, we argue that this flexibility is desirable, as
it allows us to capture forms of pessimism that RDU cannot.
An advantage of our approach is that it allows us to understand the implications of
hedging under subjective uncertainty while relaxing expected utility on objective un-
certainty. Despite being pessimistic (in the sense that they evaluate each act with the
worst prior), our DMs need not exhibit Ellsberg paradox-type behavior. The opposite
may occur if objective probabilities are “distorted” more than subjective probabilities.4
Thus, the model is compatible with the evidence of such behavior in different contexts
(e.g., Tversky and Fox 1995). Although we deem such generality desirable, the special
case in which behavior does not contradict the Ellsberg paradox is of natural interest,
and in Section 3 we introduce a novel additional axiom that captures this case. Adding
this axiom restricts the parameters in our representation, linking the distortions applied
to objective and subjective bets, guaranteeing that the former are “less severe” than the
latter.
Section 4 discusses the relationship between our work and the literature. There are
a small number of papers that explicitly consider the relationship between Allais-like
behavior and uncertainty aversion. Segal (1987a, 1990) connects the Allais and Ells-
berg paradoxes by suggesting that ambiguous acts can be seen as compound lotteries.
Wakker (2001) focuses on the case in which the agent’s preferences take the form of Cho-
quet expected utility for both risk and ambiguity, and shows that by generalizing the
common consequence effect, one can characterize pessimism in both the objective and
subjective domains. Our assumption of a generalized preference for hedging is arguably
of a similar spirit, although applicable to a broader class of preferences. Ghirardato et al.
(2003) show that one can obtain an MMEU-like representation on Savage acts by con-
sidering outcome mixtures and disregarding objective lotteries, thus not restricting, but
also not modeling, how the agent reacts to them.5
4This possibility has been noted by Epstein (1999) and Wakker (2001). Indeed this result shows that
when preferences are not expected utility for objective lotteries the well known link between preferences
for hedging on the one hand and Ellsberg-like behavior on the other no longer holds as our preferences
abide by the former but not the latter.
5Other results appear in Klibanoff et al. (2005) and Drapeau and Kupper (2013). We refer to Section 4 for
more details.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal
setup, the axioms, and the representation theorem. Section 3 studies the special case in
which the agent always distorts subjective probabilities more than objective ones. Sec-
tion 4 discusses the relevant literature. Appendix A describes an an alternative, equiva-
lent representation in which subjects treat objective lotteries like ambiguous prospects.
Appendix B discusses how our model generates the Allais paradox. Appendix C describes
what happens when the assumption of hedging neutrality is added to our model. Ap-
pendix D contains proofs.
2. The model
2.1 Formal setup
We consider a standard Anscombe–Aumann setup with the additional restrictions that
the set of consequences is both connected and compact. Consider a finite (nonempty)
set  of states of the world and a (nonempty) set X of consequences that we assume
is a connected and compact subset of a metric space.6 By (X) we denote the set of
simple probability measures over X , and F denotes the set of Anscombe–Aumann acts
f : → (X). We metrize (X) such that metric convergence on it coincides with weak
convergence of Borel probability measures. We metrize F pointwise.
Our primitive is a complete, transitive, nondegenerate binary relation  on F , the
symmetric and asymmetric components of which are denoted ∼ and .
We use additional standard notation. We denote by δx ∈ (X) the degenerate lottery
(Dirac measure at x) that yields the prize x ∈X with certainty. For any x y ∈X and α ∈
(01), αx+ (1−α)y is the lottery that returns x with probability α and y with probability
(1− α). With the usual slight abuse of notation, for any p ∈ (X), p is the constant act
in F such that p(ω) = p for all ω ∈ . For any p ∈ (X), cp is the certainty equivalent
of p, i.e., an element of X such that p ∼ δcp . When || = 1, this setup coincides with a
standard preference over von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM lotteries), a special case of
particular interest for our analysis.
We note that we use the setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) for convenience,
as it allows for both risk and uncertainty, and because it makes comparisons with other
models more direct. However, it is straightforward to translate our results into an alter-
native setup in which preferences are defined over the union of simple vNM lotteries on
X and Savage acts with consequences X , i.e., (X)∪X.7
2.2 Axioms
We begin by imposing some basic axioms on our preference relation. To this end, we use
the following standard definition of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD).
6It is standard practice to generalize our analysis to the case in which X is a connected and compact
topological space or to the case in which the state space is infinite. To do the latter, we would need to adapt
the continuity axiom (Axiom 3): see Section 2.2, specifically the discussion after Axiom 3.
7This alternative setup might be appealing as it contains no assumptions on the timing of the resolution
of uncertainty and risk (as opposed to the setup in Anscombe and Aumann 1963).
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Definition 1. For any pq ∈ (X), we say that p first order stochastically dominates
q, denoted p FOSD q, if p({x : δx  δz}) ≥ q({x : δx  δz}) for all z ∈ X . We say that
pFOSD q if pFOSD q and p({x : δx  δz}) > q({x : δx  δz}) for some z ∈X .
Axiom 1 (FOSD). For any pq ∈ (X), if pFOSD q, then p  q, and if pFOSD q, then
p q.
Axiom 2 (Monotonicity). For any fg ∈F , if f (ω) g(ω) for all ω ∈, then f  g.
Axiom 3 (Continuity). The sets {g ∈F : g  f } and {g ∈F : g 	 f } are closed for all f ∈F .
The axioms above are standard and implied by most models. Axiom 1 imposes com-
pliance with FOSD for objective lotteries. Axiom 2 posits that if what f returns is better
than what g returns in every state of the world, then f must be preferred to g. Axiom 3 is
a standard continuity assumption.8
We now introduce the notion of outcome mixture that will be central to our analysis.
We follow Ghirardato et al. (2003) to define “outcome mixtures” for the consequences
in X .9 We will then extend this idea to the outcome mixture of lotteries and of acts.
Consider two consequences x y ∈X and suppose that, in some model, the agent as-
signs a utility to all elements of X . We wish to identify the element with a utility halfway
between those of x and y. Ghirardato et al. (2003) introduce a technique that allows us to
elicit this element for any continuous utility function, as long as preferences are well be-
haved (in a sense discussed below). We will adapt their technique, originally developed
for Savage acts, to the case of objective lotteries.
Definition 2. For any x y ∈X , if δx  δy , we say that z ∈X is a 12 -mixture of x and y, if
δx  δz  δy and
1
2x+ 12y ∼ 12c 12x+ 12 z +
1
2c 12 z+ 12 y 	 (1)
We denote z by 12x⊕ 12y.10
Consider some x y z ∈ X such that δx  δz  δy and (1) holds. The lottery on the
left is simply a 50% chance of x and a 50% chance of y. The lottery on the right is a 50%
chance of two other outcomes: the first is the certainty equivalent of a 50% chance of x
and a 50% chance of z; the second is the certainty equivalent of a 50% chance of z and
8To extend our analysis to an infinite state space we would have to adapt Axiom 3 (continuity) and require
(i) {α ∈ [01] : αf + (1−α)g  h} and {α ∈ [01] : h αf + (1−α)g} are closed, and (ii) {q ∈ (X) : q p} and
{q ∈ (X) : q 	 p} are closed for all p ∈ (X). We would then obtain representations identical to ours, but
in which the measures over  are just finitely additive. Adding Arrow’s monotone continuity axiom would
then guarantee countable additivity (see Chateauneuf et al. 2005).
9The idea of using one element of the outcomes as an alternative to probability mixtures was, to our
knowledge, introduced by Gul (1992). Similar approaches appear in Chew and Karni (1994), Wakker (1994),
Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2000a, 2000b), and Köbberling and Wakker (2003). See Section 4 for more.
10For simplicity of notation, in most of the following discussion we drop the subscript and denote the
mixture above only by ⊕.
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a 50% chance of y. Under expected utility, a DM will be indifferent between them if and
only if z has a utility exactly halfway between those of x and y. Ghirardato et al. (2003)
show that this is also true for all preferences in the much broader class of “locally bi-
separable” preferences—essentially, those for which a cardinally unique utility function
can be identified.
Because X is connected and preferences are continuous, such an outcome mix-
ture will always exist. Furthermore, we can extend this definition to any other mixture
λx⊕ (1− λ)y for any dyadic rational λ ∈ (01) by simply iteratively applying the above
definition.11 We refer to Ghirardato et al. (2001, 2003) for further discussion.
Although the element 12x⊕ 12y is always well defined in our setting, its interpretation
presumes the existence of a utility function that is, in some sense, cardinally unique.
We now provide a necessary and sufficient condition to guarantee that this is the case.
Consider some x, y, z′, z′′ such that z′ and z′′ are “in between” x and y according to .
Then consider the two lotteries
1
2c 12x+ 12 z′ +
1
2c 12 y+ 12 z′′ and
1
2c 12x+ 12 z′′ +
1
2c 12 y+ 12 z′ 	
In the former lottery, x is mixed with z′ and y with z′′, and then they are mixed together;
in the latter, x is mixed first with z′′ and y is mixed with z′, and then they are mixed
together. In both cases, the only weight involved is 12 , and x is always mixed with some
element worse than it, whereas y is mixed with some element better than it. The only
difference is in the “order” of this mixture. The following axiom guarantees that the agent
is indifferent between these two lotteries; she should not care about this order. This
axiom is an adaptation of the E-substitution axiom in Ghirardato et al. (2001) to the
case of objective lotteries.
Axiom 4 (Objective trade-off consistency). Consider any x y z′ z′′ ∈ X such that δx 
δz′  δz′′  δy , and c 1
2 r+ 12 s exists for r = x y and s = z
′ z′′. Then we have
1
2c 12x+ 12 z′ +
1
2c 12 y+ 12 z′′ ∼
1
2c 12x+ 12 z′′ +
1
2c 12 y+ 12 z′ 	
Axiom 4 is clearly satisfied under expected utility, as it is a weakening of indepen-
dence on objective lotteries (under which both would be indifferent to a lottery that
returns each outcome with probability 14 ). However, it holds for a much broader class
of preferences: for example, it is satisfied by an agent who evaluates each lottery of the
form 12a + 12b, where δa  δb, by γ( 12)u(a) + (1 − γ( 12))u(b), where γ( 12) could be any
number between 0 and 1. Thus, Axiom 4 is compatible with even extreme forms of prob-
ability weighting and is satisfied by many generalizations of expected utility suggested
in the literature—from RDU to Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion.
11Any λ ∈ [01] is dyadic rational if for some finite N , we have λ=∑Ni=1 ai/2i , where ai ∈ {01} for every i




2zN ⊕ 12 y)) · · · ), where for every i, zi = x if ai = 1 and zi = y otherwise. Alternatively, we could have de-
fined λx⊕λy for any real number λ ∈ (01) by defining it for dyadic rationals first, and then using continuity
of the preferences to define it for the whole [01]. The two approaches are clearly identical in our axiomatic
structure; we choose to use the most restrictive definition to state the axioms in the weakest form of which
we are aware.
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Following the literature, it is straightforward to show that Axioms 1–4 are sufficient
to guarantee that we can find a utility representation that is cardinally unique, thus al-
lowing us to interpret ⊕ in a meaningful way. (See, for example, Lemma 1 in Ghirardato
et al. 2001.)
We now extend outcome mixtures to mixtures of lotteries and acts, one of the key
contributions of our paper and an essential step in defining the notion of hedging at
the core of our analysis. We begin by extending the concept to mixtures of lotteries.
Consider p= 12x+ 12y and q= 12z+ 12w, where δxδz  δyδw. If we assume a joint distri-
bution between them, we can construct a mixture of these two lotteries using outcome
mixtures. For example, if we imagine that p always pays out x when q pays out z, we can
construct a lottery r that half of the time pays out 12x⊕ 12z (the prize with utility halfway
between those of x and z) and half of the time pays out 12y ⊕ 12w. We would describe r as
a mixture of p and q.
The above description is clearly only one of many possible ways to combine p and
q, assuming a particular joint distribution. Intuitively, as δxδz  δyδw, we have com-
bined the two lotteries as if they were positively correlated. Alternatively, we could




2x⊕ 12w)+ 12( 12y ⊕ 12z). We could also combine them in many other ways depending
on the assumptions regarding their joint distribution. Thus, for any two lotteries, we
have a set of possible mixtures.
More generally, we can regard any two lotteries p and q as random variables on some
underlying measure space, Vp and Vq. There are many ways to construct such random
variables, each of which would entail the same marginal distribution over prizes for Vp
and Vq separately but would generate different joint distributions of their returns. For
any given joint distribution, we can construct a third random variable that returns prizes
with utilities that are exactly the mixture of the utilities of the prizes returned by the
original lotteries—the random variable 12Vp ⊕ 12Vq. This, in turn, defines a lottery r ∈
(X). Depending on the joint distribution of Vp and Vq, we obtain different lotteries
that constitute the set of mixtures between p and q.12 We define p⊕ q as the set of all
such mixtures for all possible joint distributions.13
This concept of mixing of objective lotteries is similar to the standard notion of mix-
ing of two financial assets to create a portfolio, with two substantial differences. First,
we make no assumptions on the joint distribution of the lotteries, and thus we obtain
the set of possible portfolios—one for each joint distribution. Second, here the mixture
takes place in utilities, rather than in the prizes: thus a mixture between $10 and $0 is not
necessarily $5; instead, the monetary amount yields utility halfway between those of $10
12We thank Fabio Maccheroni for suggesting this interpretation.
13A more direct construction would proceed as follows. Consider any lottery p and q, and notice
that, because both are simple lotteries, we could always find some x1 	 	 	  xn y1 	 	 	  yn ∈ X , and some
γ1 	 	 	  γn ∈ [01] such that p=
∑n
i=1 γiδxi and q =
∑n
i=1 γiδyi . (For example, the lotteries p= 12x+ 12 y and
q = 13 z + 23w could be both written as p = 13x+ 16x+ 16 y + 13 y and q = 13z + 16w + 16w + 13w.) Then the set
p ⊕ q will be the set of all combinations r such that r = ∑ni=1 γi( 12xi ⊕ 12 yi). That is, we have p ⊕ q :=
{r ∈ (X) : ∃x1 	 	 	  xn y1 	 	 	  yn ∈ Xγ1 	 	 	  γn ∈ [01] such that p =
∑n
i=1 γiδxi  q =
∑n
i=1 γiδyi and r =∑n
i=1 γiδ( 12 xi⊕ 12 yi)}.
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and $0. This latter point has an important implication. In finance, a portfolio compris-
ing assets of equal expected value will have the same expected value but (weakly) lower
variance in monetary terms. Thus, a risk-averse agent may strictly prefer the portfolio to
the underlying assets. Instead, under our definition, the mixture of two lotteries of equal
expected utility will lead to a lottery with the same expected utility but a weakly lower
variance in utility terms.
Finally, we define outcome mixtures for acts. We do so pointwise: an act h is a 12 -
mixture between two acts f and g if h(ω) ∈ f (ω)⊕ g(ω) for all ω ∈; that is, if for every
state, it returns a lottery that is a mixture between the lotteries returned by f and g. We
denote f ⊕ g as the set of all such mixtures of two acts.
We are now ready to introduce the main axiom of this paper.
Axiom 5 (Hedging). For any fg ∈F and for any h ∈ f ⊕ g, if f ∼ g, then h f .
We argue that this axiom captures pessimism about both risk and uncertainty. Let
us begin with the former. Consider two lotteries p and q such that p∼ q, and a lottery r
that could be obtained as a mixture between p and q, i.e., r ∈ p⊕ q.
Note that any expected utility (EU) agent should be neutral to this form of hedging,
i.e., should rank r ∼ p∼ q. For an expected utility maximizer, p∼ q only if the expected
utility of p is equal to that of q. Therefore, r must have the same expected utility but will
have weakly lower variance in utilities than either p or q. While a risk-averse EU agent
might prefer to reduce the variance in dollar amounts, she must be neutral to variance
in utilities because the EU functional is linear in utilities.14
By contrast, we propose that an agent who violates EU, as suggested by the Allais
paradox, will not be neutral to this form of hedging. Almost by definition, such an agent
dislikes exposure to risk to a greater extent than what can be explained by the curvature
of the utility function and must also therefore be averse to the variance in utilities. Our
agent should thus (weakly) prefer r to p or q, irrespective of how r is constructed: just
as in finance, a risk-averse EU agent who is indifferent between two portfolios must
weakly prefer a mixture between them, irrespective of their correlation; here, an Allais-
like agent should weakly prefer to hedge in utilities between two lotteries, irrespective
of construction.
As an example, consider a lottery p that returns $10 and $0 with probability 12 . For
simplicity, consider its mixtures with an identical lottery. If we construct the mixture
treating the two lotteries as perfectly positively correlated, we again obtain the original
lottery, indifferent to itself. However, if we construct the mixture assuming that they
are negatively correlated—when one returns $10, the other returns $0—we obtain a de-
generate lottery that returns, with probability 1, the dollar amount 12$10 ⊕ 12$0. Thus,
14In fact, as we analyze in Appendix C, there is a sense in which expected utility could be defined by such
neutrality to hedging, in a fairly weak sense. To see it in the algebra, recall that (footnote 13) we must be
able to find some x1 	 	 	  xn y1 	 	 	  yn ∈X , ∃γ1 	 	 	  γn ∈ [01] such that p=
∑n
i=1 γiδxi , q=
∑n
i=1 γiδyi , and
r =∑ni=1 γiδ( 12 xi⊕ 12 yi). Under expected utility we must have that u( 12xi ⊕ 12 yi)= 12u(x)+ 12u(y), which means
that if the expected utility of p and of q are the same, so must be that of r.
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mixing has removed all variance in utilities. While an expected utility agent will be in-
different to such a change—the expected utility of p is exactly that of 12$10⊕ 12$0—a pes-
simistic agent should appreciate this reduced variance and be attracted to this degener-
ate lottery. More generally, mixing any lottery p with itself returns a lottery that is more
concentrated toward the mean in utility terms. A pessimistic agent should prefer this
reduction in exposure and thus exhibit a preference for hedging.
Our notion of hedging is related to other notions of pessimism over objective lotter-
ies that that have been suggested by the literature. As the next section clarifies, within
the context of RDU preferences, the hedging axiom requires that weighting functions be
convex (i.e., pessimistic).15
We can easily extend this argument to hedging between acts. For simplicity, consider
two nondegenerate acts fg ∈ F such that f ∼ g, and f (ω) and g(ω) are degenerate
lotteries for all ω. Now, consider some h ∈ f ⊕ g, and notice that h(ω) = δ 1
2 f (ω)⊕ 12g(ω).
Because no lotteries are involved, going from f and g to h does not affect the exposure
to risk: in either case, there is none. However, it will reduce the exposure to uncertainty:
this is precisely the idea of the original hedging axiom of Schmeidler (1989).16 An agent
who is not uncertainty seeking would then (weakly) prefer hedging, and she will rank h
at least as highly as f and g.
While the hedging axiom imposes a preference for hedging for both risk and uncer-
tainty, it posits no constraints on whether this preference should be stronger in one of
the two environments. It is possible for a DM to exhibit pessimism only in the risk do-
main or only in the uncertainty domain: the axiom could equivalently be written as two
separate axioms, one for risk and one for uncertainty.17 This observation will be relevant
for our future discussion of our model’s implications for ambiguity-averse behavior.
Our final axiom is the translation of the idea of the certainty-independence axiom
of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to our setup:18 when two acts are mixed with a neutral
element, their ranking should not change. In contrast to certainty independence, how-
ever, the neutral element is not a constant act but a degenerate lottery, which is neutral
regarding both risk and uncertainty. We again employ outcome mixtures because our
agent could have nonlinear reactions to probability mixtures.19
15Gumen et al. (2014) introduce a general notion of pessimism for preferences under risk. They show
(Gumen et al. 2014, p. 22) how our hedging axiom coincides with their notion of pessimism within the
context of biseparable EU preferences.
16In fact, if we impose independence for elements of (X), then a preference for hedging in outcome
mixtures is identical to preference for hedging in probabilities. In turn, when applied only to acts that map
to degenerate lotteries, this is precisely the axiom suggested in Ghirardato et al. (2003).
17In particular, it would be equivalent to (i) for any pq ∈F and for any r ∈ p⊕q, if p∼ q, then r  p, and
(ii) for any fgh ∈F such that f (ω) and g(ω) are degenerate lotteries, if f ∼ g and h(ω)= 12 f (ω)⊕ 12g(ω),
then h f . The latter coincides with the postulate in Ghirardato et al. (2003).
18A preference relation satisfies certainty indepedence if for any fg ∈ F and for any p ∈ (X) and λ ∈
(01), we have f  g if and only if λf + (1− λ)p λg+ (1− λ)p.
19This axiom is strictly weaker than certainty independence, as the latter implies standard independence
on constant acts, which in turn implies that probability mixtures and outcome are indifferent for her: we
must have λf + (1− λ)δx ∼ λf ⊕ (1− λ)δx for all f ∈ F , x ∈X , and λ ∈ (01). But then certainty indepen-
dence would naturally imply Axiom 6.
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Axiom 6 (Degenerate independence (DI)). For any fg ∈ F , dyadic λ ∈ (01), and for
any x ∈X ,
f  g ⇔ λf ⊕ (1− λ)δx  λg⊕ (1− λ)δx	
2.3 The multiple priors–multiple weighting representation
We are now ready to discuss our representation. To this end, it will be useful to recall the
RDU model for preferences over lotteries in (X).
Definition 3. We say that a function ψ : [01] → [01] is a probability weighting if it is
increasing and ψ(0) = 0, ψ(1) = 1. For every nonconstant function u and every proba-
bility weighting ψ, we say that a function from (X) to R is a (RDU) function with utility
u and weight ψ, denoted RDUuψ, if, for any enumeration of the elements of the support






















The main feature of the RDU model is that the DM follows a procedure similar
to expected utility, except that she distorts the cumulative probability distribution of
each lottery using a probability weighting function. The RDU model has many desir-
able properties, such as preserving continuity (provided that the probability weighting
is continuous) and FOSD. Depending on the shape of ψ, moreover, it allows for attrac-
tion or aversion to certainty: the former occurs when ψ is convex, leading to Allais-like
behavior; the opposite occurs when ψ is concave. When ψ is linear, it coincides with
expected utility.20 The RDU model is arguably the most well known non-expected util-
ity model for objective lotteries. The cumulative prospect theory model of Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), for example, is based on its framework.
In our representation, objective lotteries are assessed using a generalization of the
RDU model, while acts are then assessed in a manner similar to the MMEU model.
Definition 4. Consider a complete and nondegenerate preference relation  on F .
We say that  admits a multiple priors–multiple weighting (MP-MW) representation
(u) if there exists a continuous utility function u : X → R, a convex and compact
set of probability measures  on , and a convex, (pointwise) compact set of differen-
tiable and convex probability weightings  such that  is represented by the functional













20See Quiggin (1982), and also Wakker (1994), Nakamura (1995), Chateauneuf (1999), Starmer (2000),
Wakker (2001, 2010), Abdellaoui (2002), Köbberling and Wakker (2003), and the many references therein.
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We say that  is minimal if there is no ′ ⊂  such that the same preferences can be
represented by a multiple priors–multiple weighting representation (u′).
Theorem 1. Consider a complete and nondegenerate preference relation  on F . The
following statements are equivalent:
(i) The relation  satisfies Axioms 1–6.
(ii) There exists a multiple priors–multiple weighting representation (u) of .
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation,  is unique, and there
exists a unique minimal.
In a multiple priors–multiple weighting representation, the DM is endowed with
three elements: a utility function u, a set of priors  over the states in , and a set of
convex probability weightings . With respect to uncertainty, her behavior is conceptu-
ally identical to the maxmin expect utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989): she
has a set of priors  on the states of the world, and she uses the worst one of them to
aggregate the utilities returned in each state. The model differs from MMEU in the eval-
uation of objective lotteries. Instead of following vNM expected utility, the agent has a
set of convex probability weightings , and she uses the worst one of those in an RDU
functional to evaluate objective lotteries.
Because each of the probability weightings in  is convex and the agent uses the
worst one to evaluate the lottery at hand, the agent will have pessimistic evaluations of
objective lotteries, generating violations of expected utility in line with the Allais para-
dox. In particular, as we show in Appendix B, the model is always weakly compatible
with a generalized version of Allais’ common consequences effect, while ruling out con-
trary violations.21
In the case of only objective risk, i.e., when || = 1, our model is a strict generaliza-
tion of RDU with convex distortions. We argue that this additional flexibility could be de-
sirable. Consider the lotteriesp= 13$0+ 13$1+ 13$10,000 and q= 13$0+ 13$9,999+ 13$10,000.
Under RDU, the agent must use the same probability distortion for both p and q: the
rank of the three outcomes is the same, and because in RDU only the relative rank mat-
ters, the probability distortion is restricted to be the same.22 Specifically, under RDU,
the agent distorts the intermediate outcome in the same way, despite the fact that in
p this intermediate outcome is comparably very bad, while in q it is comparably very
21In particular, for some prize $z, and probabilities q and r such that q+ r < 1, find the amount $x such
that δz ∼ r$0+q$z+(1−q−r)$x and the amount $y such that q$0+(1−q)$z ∼ (r+q)$0+(1−q−r)$y. The
common consequence effect implies that x > y . (The standard Allais’ version uses r = 0	01 and q = 0	89.)
Intuitively, the DM exhibits a preference for certainty. Segal (1987b) showed that, in the context of the
RDU model, convexity of the weighting function is necessary and sufficient for a DM to (weakly) exhibit
the common consequence effect. In Appendix B we show that the latter holds also for the multiple convex
weightings case: In problems of the above form, a DM who behaves in line with the MP-MW model can
have x > y , but cannot have y > x. We note also that our model does not, however, guarantee that the DM
will always exhibit the common ratio effect. In the context of the RDU model, convex probability weighting
is not enough to guarantee this, and thus the same must hold for our model.
22In fact, this is one of the characterizing features of RDU: see Diecidue and Wakker (2001).
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good. By contrast, the MP-MW model allows for the case in which in p both the prob-
abilities of $0 and of $1 are substantially overweighted and the probability of $10,000 is
underweighted; while for q, only the probability of $0 is overweighted and those of both
$9,999 and $10,000 are underweighted—a behavior that we believe better accords with
intuitive notions of pessimism.
While our model is a generalization of the RDU model with convex weighting, it does
not allow for other weighting functions, including either concave or S-shaped proba-
bility weightings (the latter of which have received empirical support from, for exam-
ple, Gonzalez and Wu 1999). This is a direct implication of our application of hedging
(and therefore pessimism) to all lotteries.23 In fact, one can think of the relationship
between the multiple weighting model and RDU for objective risk as similar to that be-
tween MMEU and the Choquet expected utility (CEU) model of Schmeidler (1989) for
subjective acts.24
Three special cases of our representations are of particular interest: first, when 
contains only the identity function, the models coincide with MMEU (with continuous
Bernoulli utility); second, when  is a singleton, which precludes uncertainty aversion
but allows for distortions of objective lotteries; third, when  is a singleton but differs
from the identity function, and thus the ranking of objective lotteries coincides with
RDU. Clearly, the first two could be obtained by imposing forms of “hedging neutral-
ity.” For brevity, we discuss these conditions in Appendix C, where we show that the
first case can be characterized by assuming that objective and subjective mixtures co-
incide, at least locally. To characterize the case in which  is a singleton, it suffices to
add one of the axioms suggested in the literature to guarantee that the preferences are of
the RDU form for objective lotteries; for example, the probability trade-off consistency
axiom of Abdellaoui (2002) or some of the equivalents of Schmeidler’s (1989) axiom of
co-monotonic independence, e.g., both the co-monotonic sure-thing principle and the
co-monotonic mixture independence axioms of Chateauneuf (1999).25
We conclude by noting that in the representation above, there is a sense in which the
DM could be considered uncertainty averse: when ||> 1, the agent has a set of priors
and uses the worst one of those to judge uncertain events. However, this does not imply
that the agent will exhibit the Ellsberg paradox: both Ellsberg behavior and its opposite
are compatible with our representations, even if ||> 1.
To see why, consider an urn with 100 balls that can be red or black, in unknown pro-
portions. An experimenter will extract a ball from this urn, and the color of the extracted
23One could adapt our approach to allow for S-shaped weighting functions by restricting the class of
lotteries to which the hedging axiom is applied, in the manner of (for example) Diecidue et al. (2009).
24Recall that CEU satisfies Schmeidler’s (1989) axiom of co-monotonic independence, but need not sat-
isfy its uncertainty aversion axiom, while MMEU satisfies the latter, but may violate the former. Similarly,
RDU satisfies a version of co-monotonic independence for risk, but in its general form allows for distor-
tions of many kinds, not only pessimistic ones. By contrast, our model may violate the equivalent of co-
monotonic independence, but restricts attention to pessimistic distortions.
25In turn, this implies that our axioms (esp. hedging) together with those that characterize RDU, im-
ply the attraction for certainty axiom of Chateauneuf (1999), or probabilistic risk aversion as defined in
Abdellaoui (2002), or the pessimism condition of Wakker (2001), since they are all implied by the existence
of a convex RDU representation.
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ball determines the state of the world, R or B. Consider the following three acts: bet-
ting on R (i.e., receiving $10 if a red ball is extracted, $0 otherwise), betting on B, and
an objective lottery that pays $10 or $0 with equal probability. Assume that the DM is
indifferent between betting on red or black. The typical Ellsberg behavior is that the DM
strictly prefers the objective lottery to either of the bets. Indeed, the MP-MW model al-
lows this: for example, if || > 1 and  contains only the identity function, the model
coincides with MMEU, which is compatible with Ellsberg behavior. However the MP-
MW model is also compatible with the opposite behavior: if = {(0	50	5)} and  is not
equal to the identity function, the agent will prefer either bet to the objective lottery, as
she distorts objective probabilities but not subjective ones.26
The MP-MW model does not guarantee Ellsberg-like behavior because it does not
posit that the agent should be “more pessimistic” for subjective bets than she is for ob-
jective ones: there is no relationship between the sets  and . This is a direct conse-
quence of the fact that our main axiom, hedging, imposes no restriction on the relative
pessimism of the agent between subjective and objective bets, and, as noted in Wakker
(2001), one should regard Ellsberg-type behavior as the product of relative, rather than
absolute, pessimism.27 In other words, our axiom imposes a generalized preference for
hedging, but our theorem shows that this is insufficient to guarantee Ellsberg-like be-
havior in general. When preferences violate expected utility on objective lotteries, then
the well known link between preferences for hedging, on the one hand, and Ellsberg-like
behavior, on the other, no longer holds.28
We consider this flexibility desirable, as it allows the model to be compatible with
the experimental evidence documenting behavior opposite that of Ellsberg in some en-
vironments (e.g., Tversky and Fox 1995). However, the special case in which behavior is
restricted to never violating the Ellsberg paradox is of natural interest. This is discussed
and characterized axiomatically, in Section 3.
2.4 Proof sketch of Theorem 1
In what follows, we sketch the proof of Theorem 1. We omit many details and focus only
on the sufficiency of the axioms. A complete proof appears in Appendix D.
26A similar result could be obtained also when ||> 1, as long as the distortions of objective probabilities
are stronger than those of subjective ones.
27In light of this discussion and to avoid confusion, we shall call uncertainty averse an agent who exhibits
a preference for hedging—as in our model—but who may (or may not) exhibit the opposite of Ellsberg
behavior. We will call ambiguity averse an agent who never does. See Section 3 for a more formal definition.
(This is in line with Wakker 2001, Section 6; see also Ghirardato 2004 for more discussion.)
28This is all the more explicit if we consider what exactly the hedging axiom does in the proof of The-
orem 1. In a nutshell, what we do is that we map objective lotteries into acts on a fictitious state space
[01]. Thus, we map the Anscombe–Aumann setup to the space of acts on  × [01]. Then we show that
the hedging axiom implies that the preferences over these acts satisfy uncertainty aversion, where mixtures
are performed in utilities. That is, the hedging axiom implies a generalized preference for hedging on both
parts of the state space,  and [01]. We then proceed to obtain the multiple prior representation in each
dimension. In this sense, the hedging axiom posits a very symmetric condition on the two parts of the state
space, treating them in a similar manner. However, it does not posit anything on the relative preference for
hedging in each dimension, and thus does not constrain the sets of priors involved.
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Step 1. Map acts  → (X) to acts × [01] → X and obtain a derived relation ′.
Consider the extended state space × [01] and call F ′ the (Savage) acts on this space,
i.e., the set of functions from  × [01] to X with the appropriate measurability.29 We
can map each of the Anscombe–Aumann acts in F to acts in F ′ as follows: each f ∈ F
is mapped to the acts f ′ in F ′ such that, for each state ω and prize x, the probability of
receiving x in state ω according to f , f (ω)(x), is equal to the Lebesgue measure of the
states in [01] that return x according to f ′ assuming that the other component is ω. We
then derive a preference ′ on F ′ from the original preference  on F . It can be shown
that ′ is complete, transitive, reflexive, and continuous.
Step 2. The relation ′ satisfies local bi-separability, and is convex and c-independent
with respect to ⊕. Consider the event A =  × [0 12 ] and define A := {∅AAC ×
[01]}. Axiom 4 (together with Axioms 1–3) implies that the restriction of ′ on acts
measurable in A is bi-separable in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001). Ax-
iom 5 implies that ′ is convex: if f ′ ∼ g′, then 12f ′ ⊕ 12g′ ′ f ′. This follows almost
mechanically from the axiom. Similarly, from Axiom 6 it follows that f ′ ∼′ g′ implies
αf ′ ⊕ (1− α)x∼′ αg′ ⊕ (1− α)x.
Step 3. Use the results of Ghirardato et al. (2003) to find a general representation
for ′. The previous step proved that the ′ satisfies all the conditions of Proposition 3 in
Ghirardato et al. (2003). This implies that there exists a continuous nonconstant func-
tion u : X → R and a nonempty, weak∗ compact, and convex set P of finitely additive
probabilities on the appropriate sigma algebra such that ′ is represented by





Step 4. Find a representation of  on constant acts. Define ′ as a projection of P on
[01]. From the previous step, we obtain a representation of the restriction of ′ on acts
constant on  using the set ′. We now use this to derive a representation of the restric-
tion of  on (X), i.e., on constant acts. To do so, we focus on specific mappings from
lotteries in (X) to acts on [01]: those that are decreasing, i.e., assign better outcomes
to earlier states. Specifically, we say that a mapping μ from (X) into the set of measur-
able functions from [01] to X is decreasing and measure-preserving if for all p ∈ (X)
and all x ∈ X , ([μ(p)]−1(x)) = p(x) and μ(p)(z)  μ(p)(z′) for z z′ ∈ [01] such that
z ≤ z′. We say that measure φ on [01] is state-increasing if there exist no x1, x2, x3,
x4 such that x1 < x2 < x3 < x4, ([x1x2]) = ([x3x4]) and φ([x1x2]) > φ([x3x4]). In
other words, φ assigns a greater weight to equivalent length intervals if they occur at
higher values in the state space. Following the representation in Step 3 above and the
definition of ′, it can be then shown that for any decreasing and measure-preserving










29That is, F ′ is the set of functions f from × [01] to X measurable with respect to × ∗, where  is
the power set of  and ∗ is the Borel sigma algebra on [01].
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where  is the subset of ′ composed of state-increasing measures. It can be proven
that the measures in are countably additive and atomless, that the Lebesgue measure 
belongs to, and that all measures in are mutually absolutely continuous with respect
to . It can be also shown that  is weak compact.
Step 5. Obtain a multiple prior–multiple distortions representation. Define  as the
projection of P on . Note that it is convex and compact. For any p ∈ (X), define
cp ∈X as δcp ∼ p, and for any f ∈ F , define fc ∈ F as fc(ω) = δcf(ω) . By Axiom 2, f ∼ fc
for all f . Combining with Step 3, we obtain









Using Axiom 2 and the result in Step 4, we obtain that  is represented by









where U is defined as in Step 3. We call this representation the multiple priors–multiple
distortions representation. Appendix A contains an in-depth discussion.
Step 6. Map to probability weighting. For every φ ∈ , construct the correspond-
ing cumulative distribution function, noting that each is convex, strictly decreasing,
and differentiable, because every φ is state-increasing and mutually absolutely contin-
uous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (thus admitting nondecreasing probability
density functions that are never flat at zero). Call  the set of cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) obtained. The pointwise compactness of  follows easily. The desired
representation then follows.
2.5 A comparative notion of attraction to certainty
We now show that the comparative notion of ambiguity aversion introduced in Ghirar-
dato and Marinacci (2002) translates to our setup and implies both more ambiguity aver-
sion and more probability distortions for objective lotteries. Consider two DMs, 1 and 2,
such that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1: whenever 1 prefers a certain option δx
to some act f , so does 2. This could be interpreted in two ways. First, both agents treat
both probabilities and events in the same way, but 2 has a utility function that is more
concave than that of 1. Alternatively, the curvature of the utility function is the same
for both agents, but 2 is more pessimistic than 1 is. Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002)
focus on this second case—considering the relative attraction to certainty while holding
constant the curvature of the utility function. This is obtained by focusing on the case
in which ⊕1 = ⊕2, that is, when both agents have the same approach to outcome mix-
tures. With this in mind, we use the following definition, introduced by Ghirardato and
Marinacci (2002):30
30There are two minor differences between what follows and Definition 7 in Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002). First, we require ⊕1 = ⊕2 instead of requiring that the two preferences are cardinally symmetric,
as defined in Definition 5 in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002). However, these two conditions are equiv-
alent, since both imply that the (unique) utility indexes must be positive affine transformations of each
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Definition 5. Let 1 and 2 be two complete and nondegenerate preference relations
on F . We say that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1 if the following statements
hold:
(i) ⊕1 = ⊕2 ;
(ii) For all x ∈X and all f ∈F ,
δx 1 f ⇒ δx 2 f
and
δx 1 f ⇒ δx 2 f
for some x ∈X and all f ∈F .
This has specific consequences in our setup: an agent who is more attracted to cer-
tainty must have weakly larger sets of distortions for both objective and subjective un-
certainty.
Proposition 1. Let 1 and 2 be two complete and nondegenerate preference re-
lations on F that admit minimal multiple priors–multiple weighting representations
(u111) and (u222). Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) The relation 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1.
(ii) The function u1 is a positive affine transformation of u2, 2 ⊇1, and2 ⊇1.
3. The Ellsberg paradox and relative pessimism
The purpose of this section is to characterize the special case of the MP-MW model in
which the behavior of the agent never contradicts the Ellsberg paradox.
To this end, we introduce notation to capture a way to reduce subjective to objective
risk. Consider an act f ∈ F , and suppose that for every state ω it returns a degener-
ate lottery, i.e., for all ω ∈ , we have f (ω) = δy for some y ∈ X . Consider now a prior
π ∈ (), and denote by fπ the lottery in (X) derived from f using probabilities in
π, that is, the lottery that returns f (ω) with probability π(ω). This lottery is simply the
reduction of f from subjective to objective risk using prior π. (An identical notion is used
in Ok et al. 2012.) We can then also extend this definition to acts that return nondegen-
erate lotteries, preserving the intuition: for any act f ∈ F and prior π ∈ (), denote by
fπ the lottery that returns, with probability π(ω), the certainty equivalent of f (ω). (That
is, fπ denotes the constant act that yields the lottery
∑
π(ω)cf(ω) in every state.)
Endowed with this notation, we can define the following axiom.
other. The second difference is in the name: they interpret it as higher ambiguity aversion, while we in-
terpret it more simply as attraction toward certainty, because here agents could have the same aversion to
ambiguity but different pessimism towards objective lotteries. (On this, see Ghirardato and Marinacci 2002
and Ghirardato 2004.)
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Axiom 7 (Preference for objective risk). There exists π ∈ () such that fπ  f for all
f ∈F .
The interpretation is straightforward: a DM satisfies preference for objective risk if
there is a way to reduce subjective uncertainty to objective risk that would make her
(weakly) better off. This postulate is directly related to the intuition of the Ellsberg para-
dox: the agent would strictly prefer to reduce subjective uncertainty to risk—for exam-
ple, using the prior that assigns equal probabilities of extracting each color—thus gener-
ating an objective lottery rather than keeping the ambiguous Ellsberg bets. In turn, this
axiom links the degree of pessimism applied by the agent on objective and subjective
bets. Notice that the prior used in Axiom 7 is not related directly to a representation; the
axiom only postulates the existence of some probability distribution over  for which
the requirement holds.
Our preference for objective risk axiom is naturally linked to the idea of ambigu-
ity aversion. To make this connection more formal, let us begin by defining ambiguity
neutrality in our context.
Definition 6. A preference relation  onF is ambiguity neutral if there exists π ∈ ()
such that fπ ∼ f for all f ∈F .
The notion above is very similar to probabilistic sophistication of Machina and
Schmeidler (1995):31 the agent reduces subjective to objective risk in a coherent man-
ner, using a probability measure over the states of the world, although she may violate
expected utility in evaluating the lottery obtained. In the Ellsberg experiment, an agent
who satisfies Definition 6 (with a symmetric prior) would be indifferent between betting
on an ambiguous or unambiguous urn. Indeed, the definition above could be consid-
ered a way to define, without using independence over objective lotteries, the definition
of ambiguity neutrality of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002).
Endowed with this, we can introduce the following two definitions.
Definition 7. Consider two preference relations 1 and 2 on F . We say that 2 is
more ambiguity averse than 1 if the following statements hold:
1. The relations 1 and 2 rank constant acts in the same way, i.e., p1 q if and only
if p2 q;
2. For all p ∈ (X) and f ∈F ,
p1 (1) f ⇒ p2 (2) f	
31The two notions coincide under Axioms 1–3, which implies that preferences that satisfy Definition 6
can be characterized behaviorally following the results in Machina and Schmeidler (1995) (in particular,
adding the horse/roulette replacement axiom). At the same time, both notions differ from probabilistic so-
phistication as defined by Machina and Schmeidler (1992) in a Savage setup, as here we require that not only
the agent reduces subjective uncertainty to objective risk using a prior π, but also that the non-expected
utility functional used to evaluate such reduction is the same one used to evaluate objective lotteries.
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Definition 8. We say that  is ambiguity averse if there exists a preference relation an
such that an is ambiguity neutral and  is more ambiguity averse than an.
The definitions above are related to those of Epstein (1999), although we use our
notion of ambiguous neutrality instead of probability sophistication (Machina and
Schmeidler 1992), use objective lotteries as unambiguous acts, and operate in the setup
of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). It is also similar to the definitions of Ghirardato and
Marinacci (2002), although the comparison is made with ambiguity-neutral preferences,
as opposed to subjective expected utility preferences.32
It is straightforward that ambiguity aversion has a natural relationship with our pref-
erence for objective risk axiom. This is formalized below.
Proposition 2. Consider a preference relation  on F that satisfies Axioms 1–3. Then 
satisfies Axiom 7 if and only if  is ambiguity averse.
3.1 Representation theorem
We now turn to discuss the special case of our representation that excludes the oppo-
site of the Ellsberg paradox. Intuitively, we want a representation that distorts objec-
tive bets more than subjective ones. To define this formally, we need to introduce the
distortions on priors on  implied by the distortions applied to objective probabili-
ties. To illustrate, suppose that  = {ω1ω2}, π(ω1) = π(ω2) = 0	5, and ψ(0	5) = 0	25.
What are the priors on  obtained by distorting π according to ψ? Because the effects
of probability weighting depend on the ranking of alternatives, the distorted prior de-
pends on whether the act that we are evaluating returns the best outcome in state ω1
or ω2. If it is ω1, then we obtain πˆ1 such that πˆ1(ω1) = ψ(π(ω1)) = 0	25 and πˆ1(ω2) =
ψ(π(ω1)+π(ω2))−π(ω1)= 0	75. If it is ω2, we obtain πˆ2(ω1)= 0	75 and πˆ2(ω2)= 0	25.
Thus, both πˆ1 and πˆ2 could be obtained by distorting π using ψ.
More generally, define byL the set of all enumerations of, i.e., the set of all bijective
maps l : → {1 	 	 	  ||}. For any probability weighting ψ and enumeration of the states

























It is easy to see that γψl(π) is the prior obtained by distortingπ using probability weight-
ing ψ, when the outcomes returned are ordered according to l. Using this, we can define
32The consequences of applying directly the definition of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) were dis-
cussed in Section 2.5.
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the set of all possible distorted priors for a set of probability weightings (as in our rep-
resentations) and possible enumeration: for any set of probability weightings , define
the mapping  : ()→ 2() \ {∅} by
(π) :=
{
γψl(π) : l ∈ L and ψ ∈
}
	
We are now prepared to introduce our representation theorem for this case.
Theorem 2. Consider a preference relation  on F that admits a multiple priors–
multiple weighting representation (u). The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The relation  satisfies Axiom 7.
(ii) We have ⊇ (π) for some π ∈.
Theorem 2 establishes that imposing Axiom 7, preference for objective risk, guaran-
tees that the DM always behaves in line with the Ellsberg paradox. It also shows how the
assumption that the DM is ambiguity averse refines our representation, by ensuring that
the set of possible distortions due to ambiguity is larger than the set of distortions due
to risk. Hedging alone is insufficient to guarantee that this is the case and hence does
not guarantee Ellsberg-type behavior.
4. Overview of the related literature
A large literature, considerably too large to be surveyed here, has been devoted to devel-
oping models that allow either for Allais or for Ellsberg-type behavior. However, far fewer
models exist that permit both features simultaneously in setups in which both phenom-
ena could appear independently, such as that of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). On the
one hand, the majority of models designed to study Allais-like behavior focus on objec-
tive lotteries only. On the other hand, the vast majority of models designed to capture
ambiguity aversion either do not consider objective lotteries, operating in the setup of
Savage (1954), or do consider them, operating in the setup of Anscombe and Aumann
(1963), but assume that agents satisfy vNM independence on objective lotteries.33
From the point of view of the literature on ambiguity aversion, our paper can be
considered a generalization of MMEU that allows for Allais-type preferences over objec-
tive lotteries. Indeed, ours is not the first paper to generalize MMEU in this direction.
Ghirardato et al. (2001, 2003) show that one can obtain an MMEU-like representation
on Savage acts by considering outcome mixtures and disregarding objective lotteries,
thus not restricting, but also not modeling, how the agent reacts to them. Drapeau
and Kupper (2013) introduce a model that corresponds to one in which agents exhibit
uncertainty-averse preferences as in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011b) on acts that do not
33This is imposed through an axiom called risk independence, which is vNM independence for objec-
tive lotteries, and is implied by most weakenings of independence suggested in this literature (e.g., co-
monotonic independence, certainty independence, weak certainty independence). It is also imposed in the
much more general models of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011a, 2011b) and Ghirardato and Siniscalchi (2012).
(See Gilboa and Marinacci 2016 for a survey.)
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involve objective lotteries and react to objective risk in a way similar to the model in
Cerreia-Vioglio (2009). A corollary to the main theorem in Klibanoff et al. (2005) gener-
alizes their representation to the case of non-EU preferences on objective lotteries; this
case, however, is not fully axiomatized and does not model jointly attitudes toward risk
and uncertainty.34
From the point of view of the literature on Allais-like behavior, we have already ar-
gued (Section 2.3) that our model is a generalization of RDU with convex distortions
and is therefore related to models of probability weighting. Safra and Segal (1998)
derive a model (Lemma 4) that similarly generalizes RDU for the case of linear util-
ity, beginning from an axiom, diversification, that in case of linear utilities is related
to our hedging. In addition, our model is conceptually related to models in which
the agent does not distort probabilities but has a set of utility functions and uses the
most pessimistic one of them to evaluate a lottery. These models include Maccheroni
(2002) and the cautious expected utility model of Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015), both of
which are special cases of the model in Cerreia-Vioglio (2009). While neither stud-
ies ambiguity aversion, instead focusing on risk, these models are conceptually re-
lated to ours—in some sense, they are their counterpart: while in our case the agent
has a fixed utility function and multiple probabilities, in these models the agent uses
the correct probabilities but has multiple utility functions. In Maccheroni (2002), this
conceptual difference entails also a difference in behavior, as this model need not be
compatible with Allais-like behavior. The cautious expected utility model of Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. (2015) is instead designed to model Allais-like behavior and is charac-
terized by one axiom that captures it: negative certainty independence (NCI, intro-
duced by Dillenberger 2010). Interestingly, while Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2015) prove
that the only intersection between the cautious expected utility model and RDU is
expected utility, there exist examples of preferences that can be represented as the
minimum of convex RDU, as in our model, that also admit a cautious expected util-
ity representation and yet are not expected utility.35 Thus, on the one hand, our ax-
ioms allow for behavior that is ruled out by NCI (e.g., RDU with strictly convex dis-
tortions), but on the other hand, the generalization of RDU characterized in this pa-
per is compatible with both NCI and the violation of expected utility. The model in
this paper allows for preferences that can be strictly convex, but also the opposite,
or satisfy betweenness: by contrast, under cautious expected utility, preferences must
be weakly convex, while in pessimistic RDU, they must be the opposite.36 The exact
34In addition, Chew and Sagi (2008) suggest how using the notion of “conditional small worlds” that
they introduce could generate a behavior that is consistent with both the Ellsberg and the Allais paradoxes.
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) also consider a general setup in which DMs are non-expected utility maximizers
within the same source of uncertainty (which could be objective), but may have different weighting func-
tions for different sources, generating ambiguity aversion.
35These examples are available from the authors upon request.
36The experimental evidence on convexity of preferences is mixed: while papers that study violations
of betweenness document deviations in both directions (that is, either preference or aversion to mixing),
Sopher and Narramore (2000), Dwenger et al. (2015), and Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) find explicit evidence
in support of convexity. Models that allow for strictly convex preferences can be used to study random
choice as a deliberate randomization, as in Machina (1985) and Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2017).
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relationship between NCI and our hedging axiom (Axiom 5) remains an open ques-
tion.
Our paper uses outcomes instead of probability mixtures. Procedures of this
type were introduced by Gul (1992) and appear in Chew and Karni (1994), Wakker
(1994), Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2000a, 2000b), Ghirardato et al. (2001, 2003), and
Köbberling and Wakker (2003). Our approach can be regarded as the translation of that
of Ghirardato et al. (2003) to the case of objective probabilities.37 We then use this ap-
proach to introduce the novel notion of an outcome mixture of lotteries and of acts, a
central step in our analysis.
An early approach to relating violations of expected utility observed in the objective
and subjective domains came from noting that the RDU representation is identical to
the Choquet expected utility model of ambiguity of Schmeidler (1989) (see, for exam-
ple, Wakker 2001). In contrast to this literature, we study the case of the simultaneous
presence of ambiguity aversion and Allais-like behavior instead of focusing on one of
them.38  Wakker (2001) is closely related to our contribution and focuses on the case
in which the preferences of the agent are of the Choquet expected utility form for both
risk and ambiguity, and shows that a generalization of the common consequence effect
can be used to characterize pessimism in both the objective and subjective domains.
Our generalized preference for hedging could be seen as an assumption with a similar
spirit, although applicable to a broader class of preferences (MMEU is more general than
pessimistic Choquet expected utility, and we have shown that our representation gen-
eralizes convex RDU). However, to define our notion, we use outcome mixtures, which
forces us to impose a richer structure on the space of consequences (connectedness).
Wakker (2001) also shows that the conditions that imply pessimism for subjective un-
certainty do not guarantee Ellsberg-type behavior in the presence of non-EU behavior
over objective risk. We obtain a similar result and include a novel axiom that allows us
to characterize a model in which this is guaranteed.
Segal (1987a, 1990) suggests a different channel to connect the Allais and Ellsberg
paradoxes: both can be interpreted as stemming from a failure to reduce compound
lotteries. In particular, Segal (1990) shows how RDU can be derived from such a postu-
late, and Segal (1987a) argues that the Ellsberg paradox can be seen in a similar light if
an ambiguous lottery is treated as a two-stage lottery, where the first, imaginary, stage
37The difference is that we construct subjective mixtures using objective lotteries, and all we need is bi-
separability of preferences over 50/50 lotteries—a weak requirement, as the vast majority of models of non-
EU under risk are bi-separable. By contrast, in Ghirardato et al. (2003) objective lotteries are not studied,
and they require local bi-separability in preferences over acts. This could be a demanding requirement: for
example, many models of preference under uncertainty do not satisfy it (e.g., the variational preferences of
Maccheroni et al. 2006).
38This is possible because we use the standard setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963), where both fea-
tures could be present at the same time and independently. By contrast, the approach followed by most of
the literature would not apply in this setup, and, in general, would not apply when lotteries are elements of
the simplex, as in von Neumann and Morgenstern or as in the questions of the Allais experiment: in most
of these papers, lotteries are Savage acts on a given set of states of the world with an objective probability
distribution.
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is over the possible priors. This connection, however, is based on a specific interpre-
tation of the Ellsberg paradox and on the richer setup in which two-stage lotteries are
observable.39
As discussed above, our paper is also related to Gumen et al. (2014), who analyze
subjective distortions of objective probabilities and define a behavioral notion of pes-
simism for risky prospects that is very reminiscent of uncertainty aversion. The con-
nection with our work is twofold. First, as we mentioned above, for bi-separable pref-
erences, our hedging axiom coincides with the notion of pessimism they introduce.
Second, in Appendix A, we offer an alternative but equivalent representation in which
objective lotteries are treated as ambiguous objects, a model conceptually related to
their subjective risk. The two papers are very different, however, as their goal is to in-
troduce a generalized notion of pessimism, not to provide a characterization theorem.
Appendix A: An alternative representation objective lotteries as
ambiguous objects
We now introduce an alternative representation, equivalent to the main one as well
as to the axioms, that provides a different interpretation: in this case, the pessimism
of the agent comes from the fact that the DM treats objective lotteries as “ambiguous
objects.”
In this representation, it is as if the agent imagined that an urn of measure 1 were
used to determine the prize of each objective lottery, as follows: for any lottery p, each
ball in this imaginary urn is assigned a consequence in X , starting from the worst prizes
of p and proceeding to better ones. This creates an act that maps from the state space
[01] to X . Such acts must be constructed in a way that is coherent with the original
lottery: the Lebesgue measure of balls that give x as a prize must be the same as the
probability of obtaining x from p. The prize from the lottery is then determined by ex-
tracting a ball from this urn. Formally, we define a map from objective lotteries into acts
on [01] that assigns the correct number of balls to each prize, depending on the original
lottery and such that the worst prizes are assigned to smaller states.
Definition 9. We say that a map μ from (X) to the set of measurable functions
from [01] to X is decreasing and measure-preserving if for all p ∈ (X) and all x ∈ X ,
([μ(p)]−1(x))= p(x) and μ(p)(z) μ(p)(z′) for z z′ ∈ [01] such that z ≤ z′.40
To evaluate these acts, an expected utility maximizer would use the Lebesgue mea-
sure as a prior over the balls in the urn. An agent who departs from expected utility
because she is pessimistic could instead use a different criterion, as in the following
representation.
39One could also see the setup of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) as “rich,” as it entails both objective and
subjective uncertainty with an implicit assumption about the timing of the resolution of each of them. As
we argued in Section 2.1, however, this feature is irrelevant for us: we could have carried out our analysis
even if we only observed the agent’s preference over the union of vNM lotteries and of Savage acts.
40In practice, such a mapping can be constructed for any lotteryp as follows: (i) enumerate the outcomes
in supp(p) from best to worst, i.e., xi−1  xi for i= 2 	 	 	  | supp(p)|; (ii) define μ(p) as μ(p)([0p(x1)))= x1
and μ(p)([∑i−1j=1p(xi)∑ij=1p(xi)))= xi for i= 2 	 	 	  | supp(p)|.
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Definition 10. Consider a complete and nondegenerate preference relation  on F .
We say that  admits a multiple priors andmultiple distortions representation (MP-MD)
(u) if there exists a continuous utility function u : X → R, a convex and compact
set of probability measures  on , and a convex and weak-compact set of Borel proba-
bility measures  on [01], which contains the Lebesgue measure  and such that every
φ ∈  is atomless, state increasing,41 and mutually absolutely continuous with respect
to , such that  is represented by the functional



















for any decreasing and measure-preserving map μ from (X) to the set of measurable
functions from [01] to X .
In this representation, it is as if the DM was treating objective lotteries like am-
biguous acts. First, she “converts” a lottery into an act on [01] (in a decreasing and
measure-preserving fashion). Then she evaluates it using the most pessimistic of a set
of beliefs—exactly as she evaluates other acts: she uses the worst of a set of priors  over
[01]. When  = {}, her evaluation of lotteries is equivalent to vNM expected utility.
But when  ⊃ {}, her ranking of objective lotteries will be pessimistic, (weakly) lower-
ing their evaluation by using a prior in  that gives a lower value than . It is as if she
were thinking that states (balls in the urn) associated with better outcomes were less
likely than those associated with bad ones. Since her valuation of degenerate lotteries
will not be affected—as it is independent from the prior in  that it is used—this leads
to certainty bias and Allais-like behavior.
Theorem 3. Consider a complete and nondegenerate preference relation  on F . Then
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) The relation  satisfies Axioms 1–6.
(ii) There exists a multiple priors–multiple weighting representation (u) of .
(iii) There exists a multiple priors and multiple distortions representation (u)
of .
Appendix B: Relation with the Allais paradox
In Section 2.3 we have argued how the MP-MW can allow for the behavior observed in
the common consequence effect. Here we show that the model rules out violations of
41A prior φ on [01] is state-increasing if there do not exist any x1, x2, x3, x4 such that x1 < x2 < x3 < x4,
([x1x2])= ([x3x4]), and φ([x1x2]) > φ([x3x4]).
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expected utility that go in the opposite direction. To wit, consider the following four
lotteries: p1 = $z, p2 = r · $0 + q · $z + (1 − r − q) · $x, p3 = q · $0 + (1 − q) · $z, and
p4 = (r + q) · $0 + (1 − r − q)$y for r + q < 1. Recall that the Allais experiment asked
subjects to compare the lotteries above assuming x= y = $5,000,000, z = $1,000,000, r =
0	01, and q = 0	89, and then observed the first lottery preferred to the second, but the
fourth preferred to the third. Let us now instead choose x and y in such a way to make
p1 ∼ p2 and p3 ∼ p4. Then we have a choice pattern that conforms with Allais if and
only if x≥ y.
So as to show that the MP-MW model implies that this must be the case, we make
use of a variant of the MP-MD model that we show in Appendix A to be equivalent. For
simplicity, we relax the necessity that the measure-preserving maps have to be decreas-
ing. Let (u) be such an MP-MD representation. Normalize u(z)= 1 and u(0)= 0.
We show that u(x) must be greater than or equal to u(y) and so x≥ y. Let us define the
following three events on the unit interval: E1 = [0 q), E2 = [qq + r), E3 = (q + r1].
Then consider the (measure-preserving) map from lotteries into acts on [01] defined
by the table
E1 E2 E3
p1 $z $z $z
p2 $z $0 $x
p3 $0 $z $z
p4 $0 $0 $y
Let α be the smallest weight put on E3 by any prior in , and let β be the smallest
weight put on E2 by one of the priors for which φ(E2)= α. Notice first of all that we must
have U(p2)≤ (1−α−β)+αu(x), since p2 could be evaluated using the prior above or a
worse one, so 1=U(p1)=U(p2)≤ (1−α−β)+αu(x); hence, (α+β)/α≤ u(x). Notice
also that we must haveU(p4)= αu(y) andU(p3)≤min(1−qα+β).42 Suppose first that
we have α+ β ≤ 1− q. Then αu(y) = U(p4)= U(p3) ≤ α+ β; hence, u(y) ≤ (α+ β)/α,
which means x≥ y as desired. Suppose instead that α+ β > 1− q. This means that we
have αu(y) = U(p4) = U(p3) ≤ 1 − q, so u(y) ≤ (1 − q)/α. Since u(x) ≥ (α + β)/α and
α+β> 1− q we have u(x) > (1− q)/α, so x > y. Thus x≥ y as sought.
Appendix C: Hedging neutrality and restricted violations
The main representation in this paper allows for the simultaneous violations of both
Anscombe–Aumann expected utility on acts and vNM expected utility on objective lot-
teries. We now turn to analyze the behavioral axioms that allow us to restrict violations
to only one of these domains, which amounts to different forms of hedging neutrality.
Axiom 8 (Hedging neutrality). For any fg ∈ (X) and for any h ∈ f ⊕ g, if f ∼ g, then
h∼ f .
Axiom 9 (Hedging neutrality on acts). For any fgh ∈ F such that f ∼ g, h ∈ f ⊕ g and
such that for allω ∈we have f (ω)= δx and g(ω)= δy for some x y ∈X , we have h∼ f .
42We know that u(p3)≤ 0	11 since  contains the Lebesgue measure.
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Axiom 10 (Hedging neutrality on lotteries). For any pq r ∈ (X) such that p ∼ q and
r ∈ p⊕ q, we have r ∼ p.
A different way to capture hedging neutrality is to posit that the agent is indifferent
between subjective and objective mixtures. The following axiom imposes this in a very
weak form: that there exists at least one situation in which probability and outcome
mixtures coincide.
Axiom 11 (Local neutrality for subjective and objective mixtures). There exists x y ∈X
and a dyadic λ ∈ (01) such that δx  δy and λx+ (1− λ)y ∼ δλx⊕(1−λ)y .
The following proposition shows the effects of including these axioms in our frame-
work.
Proposition 3. Consider a nondegenerate preference relation  that admits a multiple
priors–multiple weighting representation (u). The following hold:
(a) We have || = 1 if and only if  satisfies Axiom 9 (hedging neutrality on acts).
(b) The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The set contains only the identity function.
(ii) The relation  satisfies Axiom 10 (hedging neutrality on lotteries).
(iii) The relation  satisfies independence restricted to (X).
(iv) The relation  satisfies Axiom 11 (local neutrality for subjective and objective
mixtures).
(c) The following statements are equivalent:
(i) We have || = || = 1, and contains only the identity function.
(ii) The relation  satisfies Axiom 8 (hedging neutrality).
(iii) The relation  satisfies independence.
We emphasize point (b) in particular: under the axiomatic structure of our represen-
tation, we obtain expected utility on objective lotteries simply by imposing Axiom 11,
i.e., that there exists at least one nontrivial case in which subjective and objective mix-
tures coincide.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof of all the steps except the equivalence between
(b)(i) and (b)(iv) follows standard arguments and is therefore omitted. If  contains
only the identity function, it is also trivial to see that Axiom 11 is satisfied. Assume now
that Axiom 11 holds and that  admits a representation (u). We now argue that we
must have || = 1 and that it contains only the identify function. Suppose this is not the
case and say ψ ∈, where ψ is not the identity function. Since ψ must be convex and it
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must be a probability weighting function (increasing, ψ(0)= 0, ψ(1)= 1), then we must
also have that ψ(x) > x for all x ∈ (01). But this implies that we have RDUuψ(αx+ (1−
α)y) < αu(x) + (1 − α)u(y). Since ψ ∈ , we must then have that for all x y ∈ X such
that u(x) = u(y), and for all α ∈ (01), we must have αx+ (1−α)y ≺ δαx⊕(1−α)y , violating
Axiom 11. 
Appendix D: Proofs
For the purpose of this section, let us add the following notation: given some pq ∈
(X) and some A ⊆ , pEq denotes the acts that yield lottery p if E is realized, and q
otherwise.
Proof of Theorems 1 and 3. Since Theorem 1 is a special case of Theorem 3, it will
suffice to prove the latter.
(1) ⇒ (3). The proof will proceed with the following seven steps: (i) we construct a
derived preference relation on the Savage space with consequences X and set of states
× [01]; (ii) we prove that the continuity properties of the original preference relation
imply some continuity properties of the derived preference relation; (iii) we prove that
this derived relation is locally bi-separable (in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci
2001) for some event in the space  × [01]; (iv) we prove that the axioms imposed on
the original preference imply that the derived preference satisfies the axioms required by
Ghirardato et al. (2003) that, in turn, implies the existence of a representation similar to
maxmin expected utility, but in the larger Savage space; (v) we use this result to provide
a representation for the restriction of  to constant acts; (vi) using monotonicity, we
obtain the desired representation; (vii) we show that we can focus only on decreasing
measure-preserving maps and state-increasing priors over [01].
Step 1. Denote by  the power set of , denote by ∗ the Borel σ-algebra on
[01], and consider a state space ′ :=  × [01] with the appropriate sigma algebra
′ :=  × ∗. Define F ′ to be the set of simple Savage acts on ′, i.e., ′-measurable,
finite valued functions f ′ : ′ → X . To avoid confusion, we use f ′ g′ 	 	 	 to denote
generic elements of this space.43 Define ⊕ on F ′ like we did in F : once we have ⊕
defined on X , for any f ′ g′ ∈ F ′ and α ∈ (01), αf ′ ⊕ (1− α)g′ is the act in F ′ such that
(αf ′ ⊕ (1−α)g′)(ω′)= αf ′(ω′)⊕ (1−α)g′(ω′) for all ω′ ∈′. (Moreover, since each act in
F ′ is a function from × [01] into X , for all f ′ ∈F ′ and for all ω ∈, abusing notation,
we can denote f ′(ω ·) : [01] →X as the act that is constant in the first component ()
but not on the second component ([01]).)
We now define two maps, one from F to F ′ and the other from F ′ to F . Define first
of all γ−1 : F ′ →F as
γ−1(f ′)(ω)(x)= (f ′(ω ·)−1(x))
where (·) denotes the Lebesgue measure. It is easy to see that γ−1(f ) is well defined.
Now define γ : F → 2F ′ as
γ(f )= {f ′ ∈F ′ : f = γ−1(f ′)}	
43Following the same abuses of notation in the main setup, for any x ∈X , we also refer to the constant
act x ∈F ′, which returns x in every state.
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Notice that, by construction, we must have γ(f ) ∩ γ(g) = ∅ for all fg ∈ F such that
f = g. (Otherwise, we would have some f ′ ∈ F ′ such that γ−1(f ′) = f and γ−1(f ′) = g,
which is not possible since f = g.) Moreover, notice that we must have that γ(δx)= {x}.
Finally, notice that γF :=⋃f∈F γ(f )=F ′ by construction.
Define now ′ on F ′ as follows: f ′ ′ g′ if and only if f  g for some fg ∈F such that
f = γ−1(f ′) and g = γ−1(g′). Define by ∼′ and ′ the symmetric and asymmetric parts.
(Notice that this implies f ′ ∼′ g′ if f ′ g′ ∈ γ(f ) for some f ∈F .)
Note that ′ is a complete preference relation on F ′. The completeness of ′ is a
trivial consequence of the completeness of  and the fact that γ(F) = F ′. Similarly,
the reflexivity follows from the reflexivity of ′. To prove that ′ is transitive, consider
some f ′ g′h′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ′ g′ and g′ ′ h′. By construction, we must have some
fgh ∈F such that f = γ−1(f ′), g= γ−1(g′), and h= γ−1(h′) such that f  g and g  h.
By transitivity of , we also have f  h; hence, f ′ ′ h′ as sought.
Step 2. We now prove that the continuity properties of  are inherited by ∗. In
particular, we prove that for any (fn) ∈ (F)∞, f ∈ F , if there exists (f ′n) ∈ (F ′)∞, f ′ ∈ F ′
such that fn = γ−1(f ′n) for all n, f = γ−1(f ′), and such that f ′n → f ′ pointwise, then we
must have that fn → f .
To prove this, we will focus on the case in which fn and f are constant acts, i.e.,
fn f ∈ (X). The extension to the general case follows trivially. Assume that f ′n and f ′
as above exist: we will now prove that if pn = γ−1(f ′n) for all n and if p = γ−1(f ), then





n)d by construction of γ. (Recall that  is the Lebesgue measure.)








′)d = ∫X v(u)dp: in turn, this means ∫X v(u)dpn =∫
X v(u)dp. Since this was proved for a generic continuous v, we must have pn → p (in
weak convergence).
Step 3. We now prove that ′ is locally bi-separable for some event A ∈ ′. Con-
sider the event A =  × [0 12 ]. Define A as the algebra generated by A, i.e., A :=
{∅AAC′}, and by F ′A the corresponding set of acts, which is a subset of F ′. We will
now prove that the restriction of ′ on acts measurable under A is bi-separable in the
sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001).
Note first that there exist x y ∈X such that δx  δy . To see why, suppose, by means
of contradiction, that δx ∼ δy for all x y ∈X . Then we would have that pFOSD q for all
pq ∈ (X). By Axiom 1 (FOSD), therefore, we would have p∼ q for all pq ∈ (X). In
turn, by Axiom 2 (monotonicity) we must have f ∼ g for all fg ∈F , but this contradicts
the assumption that  is nondegenerate.
Notice also that for every f ′ g′ ∈ F ′, if f ′(ω′) ′ g′(ω′) for every ω′ ∈ ′, then
f ′  g′. To see why, consider some f ′ g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′(ω′)′ g′(ω′) for every ω′ ∈′.
Now consider f ′(ω ·) and g′(ω ·) for some ω ∈ , and notice that we have that both
γ−1(f ′(ω ·)) and γ−1(g′(ω ·)) are constant acts (in F ). Since we have f ′(ωA) ′
g′(ωA) for all A ∈ ∗, and since x ′ y if and only if δx  δy , then we must also have
that γ−1(f ′(ω ·))FOSDγ−1(g′(ω ·)) by construction. By Axiom 1 (FOSD) then, we must
have γ−1(f ′(ω ·))  γ−1(g′(ω ·)) for all ω ∈ . In turn, this means that, for the acts
fˆ  gˆ ∈F defined by fˆ (ω) := γ−1(f ′(ω ·)) and gˆ(ω) := γ−1(g′(ω ·)) for all ω ∈, we have
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fˆ  gˆ by Axiom 2 (monotonicity). But then notice that we must have that f ′ ∈ γ(fˆ ) and
g′ ∈ γ(gˆ) by construction. But this means that we have f ′ ′ g′ as sought.
Claim 1. For any x y ∈X , γ−1(xAy)= 12x+ 12y.
Proof. Notice first of all that since xAy ∈ F ′ is a constant act, then so must be
γ−1(xAy). Moreover, notice that by definition of γ−1 we must have that for all ω ∈ ,
γ−1(xAy)(ω)(x) = 12 ; similarly, for all ω ∈ , γ−1(xAy)(ω)(y) = 12 . This implies that we
have γ−1(xAy)(ω)(x)= 12x+ 12y as sought. 
Now notice that for every x y ∈X , there exists z ∈X such that z ∼′ xAy. To see why,
consider x y ∈ X , and notice that γ−1(xAy) = 12x+ 12y by Claim 1. Now notice that by
Axiom 3 (continuity) and Axiom 1 (FOSD), there must exist z ∈X such that 12x+ 12y ∼ δz .
We have previously observed that γ−1(z)= δz , which implies γ−1(z)∼ γ−1(xAy), which
implies xAy ∼′ z as sought.
Given the above discussion, for any x y ∈ X , define ce′(xAy) := z for some z ∈ X
such that xAy ∼′ z. Now notice that A is an essential event for ′.44 To see why, consider
any x y ∈X such that δx  δy (note that we have proved that they exist). Now consider
the p = 12x+ 12y. By Axiom 1 (FOSD) we must have δx  p  δy . Now consider the act
xAy ∈ F ′. Notice that we have xAy(ω × [05]) = x and xAy(ω × [0	51]) = δy for all
ω ∈. By construction, therefore, we must have xAy ∈ γ(p), x ∈ γ(δx) and y ∈ γ(δy). By
definition of ′, then we have x′ xAy ′ y as sought.
Claim 2 (AMonotonicity). For any nonnull eventB ∈ A and x y z ∈X such that x y 
z we have
x′ y ⇐ xBz ′ yBz	
Moreover, for any non-universal45 B ∈ A, x y z ∈X such that x y  z,
x′ y ⇐ zBx′ zBy	
Proof. Consider an event B ∈ A, and x y z ∈X such that x′ y. Notice that by con-
struction this implies δx  δy . Notice also that the nonnull events in A are A, AC ,
and ′. In the case of B = ′ we have xBz = x and yBz = y, which guarantees that
x ′ y. Now consider the case in which B = A. By Claim 1, γ−1(xAz) = 12x + 12z and
γ−1(yAz) = 12y + 12z. Since δx  δy , then 12x + 12z FOSD 12y + 12z, which, by Axiom 1
(FOSD), implies 12x + 12z  12y + 12z; hence, γ−1(xAz)  γ−1(yAz). By construction of
′ this implies xAz ′ yAz. Now consider the case in which B = Ac . This implies that
we have xACz = zAx and yACz = zAy. Notice, however, that by construction we must
have zAx ∈ γ( 12x+ 12z). Since we also have xAz ∈ γ( 12x+ 12z), by construction of ′ we
must have zAx∼′ xAz. Similarly, we have zAy ∼′ yAz. We have already proved that we
must have xAz  yAz, and this, by transitivity, implies zAA′ zAy as sought.
44We recall that an event E is essential if we have x′ xAy ′ y for some x y ∈X .
45An event is universal if y ∼ xAy for all x y ∈X such that x y .
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Now consider some B ∈ A that is non-universal. If B=∅, we trivially have that x′
y ⇐ zBx′ zBy. Now consider the case in which B =A. In this case we have x′ y and
we need to show zAx ′ zAy: but this is exactly what we have shown above. Similarly,
when B = AC , we need to show that if x ′ y, then xAz ′ yAx, which is again exactly
what we have shown before. 
Claim 3 (A Continuity). Let {g′α}α∈D ⊆ F ′A be a net that pointwise converges to g′. For
every f ′ ∈F ′, if g′α ′ f (resp. f ′ g′α) for all α ∈D, then g′ ′ f ′ (resp. f ′ ′ g′).
Proof. This claim is a trivial consequence of the continuity of  and of the continuity
results of ′ proved in Step 2 above. To see why, consider f ′ g′ ∈ F ′ and a net {g′α}α∈D ⊆
F ′A that pointwise converges to g′ such that g′α ′ f ′ for all α ∈ D. By construction we
must have γ−1(g′α) γ−1(f ′). Now, notice that if g′α pointwise converges to some g′, then
we must have that γ−1(g′α) converges to γ−1(g′) by Step 2 above. But then, by continuity
of  (Axiom 3), we must have γ−1(g′)  γ−1(f ′) and, therefore, g′ ′ f ′ as sought. The
proof of the opposite case (f ′ g′α for all α ∈D) is analogous. 
Claim 4 (A Substitution). For any x y z′ z′′ ∈ X and BC ∈ A such that x ′ z′ ′ y




Proof. Consider first the case in which B = ∅. In this case, the claim becomes
ce′z′Cce
′
y ∼′ ce′z′Cy , which is trivially true. The case C = ∅ is analogous. Now consider
the case B=′. The claim becomes ce′xCce′z′′ ∼′ ce′xCz′′ , which again is trivially true. The
case in which C =′ is again analogous.
We are left with the case in which B =A and C =AC . (The case B =AC and C =A
is again analogous.) In this case the claim becomes ce′xAz′A
Cce′z′′Ay ∼′ ce′xACz′′Ace′z′Cy ,
which is equivalent to ce′z′′AyAce
′
xAz′ ∼′ ce′z′′AxAce′yAz′ . Now notice that since ce′xAy ∈X
for all x y ∈X , by Claim 1, we have that γ−1(ce′z′′AyAce′xAz′)= 12ce′z′′Ay + 12ce′xAz′ . At the
same time, consider some r s ∈ X and notice that, since ce′rAs ∼′ rAs by construction,
then we must have γ−1(ce′rAs) ∼ γ−1(rAs). Since γ−1(rAs) = 12 r + 12 s again by Claim 1,
then we have that γ−1(ce′rAs)∼ 12 r + 12 s. Moreover, since ce′rAs ∈ X , then we must have
that δce′rAs ∼ δc 12 z+ 12 s . Since this is true for all r s ∈ X , then by Axiom 1 (FOSD) we must
have 12c 12 z′′+ 12 y +
1




z′′Ay + 12ce′xAz′ ; hence, γ−1(ce′z′′AyAce′xAz′)∼ 12c 12 z′′+ 12 y +
1
2c 12x+ 12 z′ . By analogous arguments, we must have γ
−1(ce′z′′AxAce
′
yAz′) ∼ 12c 12 z′′+ 12x +
1
2c 12 y+ 12 z′ . At the same time, by Axiom 4 we must have c 12 z′′+ 12 y +
1











xAz′ ∼ ce′z′′AxAce′yAz′ as sought. 
This proves that ′ is locally bi-separable in the sense of Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2001).
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Step 4. We now prove that ′ admits a representation similar to MMEU. First of all,
note that for any f ′ g′ ∈F ′, x ∈X , and α ∈ (01),
f ′ ∼′ g′ ⇒ αf ′ ⊕ (1− α)x∼′ αg′ ⊕ (1− α)x	
To see why, consider f ′ g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′. Notice that we could have f ′ ∼′ g′
in two possible cases: (i) γ−1(f ′)= γ−1(g′); (ii) γ−1(f ′) = γ−1(g′) but γ−1(f ′)∼ γ−1(g′).
In either case, we must have γ−1(f ′) ∼ γ−1(g′). By Axiom 6, then, we must have that
for any x ∈ X and α ∈ (01), αγ−1(f ′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx ∼ αγ−1(g′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx. Let us now
consider αγ−1(f ′)⊕ (1− α)δx and notice that, by construction, we must have that f ′ ⊕
(1− α)x ∈ γ(αγ−1(f ′)⊕ (1− α)δx): in fact, we must have that for every ω ∈ and every
y ∈ X , (αγ−1(f ′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx)(ω)(αy ⊕ (1 − α)x) = (f ′(ω)−1(αy ⊕ (1 − α)x)). In turn,
this means that γ−1(f ′ ⊕ (1 − α)x) = αγ−1(f ′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx. Similarly, g′ ⊕ (1 − α)x ∈
γ(αγ−1(g′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx) and γ−1(g′ ⊕ (1− α)x) = αγ−1(g′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx. Since we have
αγ−1(f ′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx ∼ αγ−1(g′) ⊕ (1 − α)δx, then by transitivity γ−1(f ′ ⊕ (1 − α)x) ∼
γ−1(g′ ⊕ (1− α)x); hence, f ′ ⊕ (1− α)x∼′ g′ ⊕ (1− α)x as sought.
Claim 5. For any f ′ g′ ∈F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′, we have 12f ′ ⊕ 12g′ ′ f ′.
Proof. Consider f ′ g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′. This can hold in two possible cases:
(i) γ−1(f ′)= γ−1(g′); (ii) γ−1(f ′) = γ−1(g′) but γ−1(f ′)∼ γ−1(g′). In either case, we must
have γ−1(f ′) ∼ γ−1(g′). Consider the act 12f ′ ⊕ 12g′ and notice that, by construction,
for all ω ∈  we have ( 12f ′(ω ·)⊕ 12g′(ω ·))(A) = 12f ′(ωA)⊕ 12g′(ωA) for all A ∈ ∗.
This means that γ−1( 12f
′(ω ·)⊕ 12g′(ω ·)) is a constant act (a lottery in (X)) and that
γ−1( 12f
′(ω ·) ⊕ 12g′(ω ·)) ∈ γ−1(f ′(ω ·)) ⊕ γ−1(g′(ω ·)) for all ω ∈ . By construction
of ⊕ in F ′, it follows that γ−1( 12f ′ ⊕ 12g′) ∈ γ−1(f ′−1(g′)). We have already established
γ−1(f ′) ∼ γ−1(g′). Thus by Axiom 5 (hedging) we must have γ−1( 12f ′ ⊕ 12g′)  γ−1(f ′);
hence, 12f
′ ⊕ 12g′ ′ f ′ as sought. 
Claim 6. There exists a continuous nonconstant function u : X → R and a nonempty,
weak∗-compact, and convex set P of finitely additive probabilities of ′ such that ′ is
represented by the functional





Moreover, u is unique up to a positive affine transformation and P is unique. Moreover,
|P| = 1 if and only if ′ is such that for any f ′ g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′ we have 12f ′ ⊕
1
2g
′ ∼′ f ′.
Proof. This claim follows directly from Proposition 3 in Ghirardato et al. (2003), where
the essential event for which axioms are defined is the event A defined above. (It should
be noted that weak∗ compactness of P follows as well.) The last part of the theorem,
which characterizes the case in which |P| = 1, is a well known property of MMEU repre-
sentations. (See Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989.) 
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Step 5. We now use the result above to provide a representation of the restriction
of  to constant acts. To this end, let us first look at the restriction of ′ to acts in F ′
that are constant in their first component: define F∗ ⊂ F ′ as F∗ := {f ′ ∈ F ′ : f ′(ω ·) =
f ′(ω′ ·) for all ωω′ ∈}. Define by ∗ the restriction of ′ to F∗.
Claim 7. There exists a unique nonempty, closed, and convex set  of finitely additive
probabilities over ∗ such that, for any enumeration of the support of {x1 	 	 	  x| supp(p)|},















Proof. Following Claim 6 and defining  as the projection of P on [01], we obtain a
nonempty, closed, and convex set  of finitely additive probabilities over ∗ such that
∗ is represented by









Notice that by construction of γ and by definition of F∗, we must have that γ(p) ⊆ F∗
for all p ∈ (X). We will now argue that, for all pq ∈ (X), we have p q if and only if
f ∗ ∗ g∗ for some f ∗ g∗ ∈ F∗ such that γ−1(f ∗)= p and γ−1(g∗)= q. To see why, notice
that if p q, then we must have f ∗ ′ g∗; hence, f ∗ ∗ g∗. Conversely, suppose that we
have f ∗ ∗ g∗ for some f ∗ g∗ ∈F∗ such that γ−1(f ∗)= p and γ−1(g∗)= q, but q p. But
then, by definition of ′, we should have g∗ ′ f ∗, a contradiction.
Notice now that for every p ∈ (X), if f ∗ g∗ ∈ γ(p), then we must have Vˆ (f ∗) =
Vˆ (g∗): the reason is, by construction of ′, we must have f ∗ ∼′∗; hence, f ∗ ∼∗ g∗ and,
hence, Vˆ (f ∗)= Vˆ (g∗). Define now V : (X)→R as V ∗(p) := Vˆ ∗(f ∗) for some f ∗ ∈ γ(p).
By the previous observation this is well defined. Now notice that we have p  q if and
only if f ∗ ∗ g∗ for some f ∗ g∗ ∈F∗ such that γ−1(f ∗)= p and γ−1(g∗)= q, which holds
if and only if Vˆ ∗(f ∗) ≥ Vˆ ∗(g∗), which in turns hold if and only if V ∗(p) ≥ V ∗(q), which
means that V ∗ represents the restriction of  on (X) as sought. 
Notice now that ∗ satisfies Arrow’s monotone continuity axiom. That is, for any
fg ∈ F∗ such that f ∗ g, and for any x ∈ X and sequence of events E1 	 	 	 En in ∗
with E1 ⊆E2 ⊆ · · · and ⋂n≥1En =∅, there exists n¯≥ 1 such that
xEn¯f ∗ g and f ∗ xEn¯g	
To prove it, consider f , g, x, and E1 	 	 	 as in the claim above. Notice first of all that for
any s ∈′, there must exist some nˆ such that for all n≥ nˆwe have s /∈ En: otherwise, if this
was not true for some s ∈ ′, we would have s ∈⋂n≥1En, a contradiction. In turn, this
means that we have xEnf → f pointwise: for any s ∈ ′, there must exist some n such
that s /∈ En and, therefore, xEnf (s)= f (s) as sought. Notice then that by the continuity
properties of ′ proved in Step 2, we must therefore have that γ−1(xEnf )→ γ−1(f ). We
now show that we must have some n¯1 ≥ 1 such that xEn¯1f ∗ g for all n ≥ n¯1. Assume,
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by means of contradiction, that this is not the case: for every n ≥ 1, there exists some
n′ ≥ n such that g ∗ xE′nf . Construct now the subsequence of E1 	 	 	 which includes
these events, i.e., the events such that g ∗ xE′n′f : by the previous argument it must be
a subsequence of E1 	 	 	 and we must have that E′1 ⊆ E′2 ⊆ · · · and
⋂
n≥1E′n = ∅. This
means that we have g ∗ xE′nf for all n. By construction this then means that we have
γ−1(g)  γ−1(xE′nf ). Now consider γ−1(xE′nf ) and notice that we have proved above
that γ−1(xE′nf ) → γ−1(f ) as n → ∞. By Axiom 3 (continuity), then we must have that
γ−1(g)  γ−1(f ), which in turns means that g ∗ f , a contradiction. An identical ar-
gument shows that there must exist n¯2 ≥ 1 such that f ∗ xEn¯2g for all n ≥ n¯2. Any
n≥max{n1 n2} will therefore give us the desired rankings.
Given that ∗ satisfies Arrow’s monotone continuity axioms, Theorem 1 in Chateau-
neuf et al. (2005) implies that all measures in  are countably additive.
Claim 8. The measures in  are atomless.
Proof. We will first of all follow a standard approach and define the likelihood ranking
induced by the ∗. In particular, define L on ∗ as





Theorem 2 in Chateauneuf et al. (2005) shows that every φ ∈  is atomless if and only
if for all A ∈ ∗ such that A L ∅, there exists B ⊆ A such that A L B L ∅, A ∈ ∗
such that A L ∅, and notice that this implies that we have minφ∈φ(A) > 0; hence,
φ(A) > 0 for all φ ∈. Since every φ ∈ is mutually absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure, this implies (A) > 0. Since  is atomless, then there exists
B⊆A such that (A) > (B) > 0. Notice that this implies (A\B) > 0. Again since allφ ∈
 are mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, we must
therefore have φ(A) > 0, φ(A\B) > 0 and φ(B) > 0 for all φ ∈. But this means that we
have φ(A)=φ(B)+φ(A \B) > φ(B) > 0 for all φ ∈. But this implies minφ∈φ(A) >
minφ∈φ(B) > 0; hence, AL B L ∅ as sought. 
Claim 9. The Lebesgue measure  belongs to . Moreover, all measures in  are mutu-
ally absolutely continuous and, in particular, they are all mutually absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure .
Proof. We will first prove that the Lebesgue measure  belongs to . Assume by means
of contradiction that  /∈. By the uniqueness of , we know that there must therefore
exist some f ∈ F∗ such that Vˆ ∗(f ) := minp∈
∫
[01] u(f (s))dp >
∫
[01] u(f (s))d. Call p1
a generic element of arg minp∈
∫








∗(s))d, and that p1(B) < (B) for some B ⊂ [01] such that
u(f (B)) < u(f (A)).
Suppose first of all that (A) ≥ (B). Now consider some f ′ ∈ F∗ constructed as
follows. Consider any C ⊆ A such that (C) = (B) and p1(C) > (C). (This must be
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possible since p1(A) > (A).) Notice that we must therefore have p1(C) > p1(B) since
p1(C) > (C) = (B) > p1(B). Now construct the act f ′ as f ′(s) = f (s) if s /∈ C ∪ B;
f ′(C)= f (B) and f ′(B)= f (A). (Notice that what we have done is that we have moved
the “bad” outcomes to some events to which p1 assigns a likelihood above the Lebesgue
measure, while we have moved the “good” outcomes to some event to which p1 assigns
a likelihood below the Lebesgue measure.) Notice now that, by construction, we must
have that f f ′ ∈ γ(p) for some p ∈ (X); hence, we must have f ∼∗ f ′. At the same
time, since p1(C) > p1(B) and since u(f (B)) < u(f (A)) = u(f (C)), we must also have
Vˆ ∗(f )= ∫[01] u(f (s))dp1 > ∫[01] u(f ′(s))dp≥minp∈ ∫[01] u(f ′(s))dp= Vˆ ∗(f ′). But this
means that we have Vˆ ∗(f ) > Vˆ ∗(f ′); hence, f  f ′, contradicting f ∼∗ f ′. The proof for
the case in which (A) < (B) is specular.
We now turn to prove that all measures in  are mutually absolutely continuous and,
in particular, they are all mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure . To prove this, we will prove that for every event E in [01], E is null for ∗
if and only if (E) = 0.46 In turn this means that all measures are mutually absolutely
continuous with respect to each other.
Consider some measurable E ⊂ [01] such that (E) = 0. Suppose, by means of
contradiction, that {φ ∈  : φ(E) > 0} = ∅. Then consider any x y ∈ X such that
δx  δy (which must exist by nontriviality) and construct the act yEx ∈ F∗. Since {φ ∈
 : φ(E) > 0} = ∅, then we must have that minφ∈φ(E)u(y) + (1− φ(E))u(x) < u(x),
which in turns means that yEx≺∗ x (by Claim 7); hence, yEx≺′ x. However, notice that,
since (E)= 0, we must have that γ−1(yEx)= δx = γ−1(x). By construction of ′, then
we must have yEx∼′ x, contradicting yEx≺′ x.
Consider now some measurable E ⊂ [01] such that (E) > 0. We now want to
show that φ(E) > 0 for all φ ∈ . Suppose, by means of contradiction, that {φ ∈
 : φ(E) = 0} = ∅. Then consider any x y ∈ X such that δx  δy (which must exist
by nontriviality) and construct the act xEy ∈ F∗. Since {φ ∈  : φ(E) = 0} = ∅, then
we must have that minφ∈φ(E)u(y) + (1 − φ(E))u(x) = u(y), which in turns means
that xEy ∼∗ y (by Claim 7); hence, xEy ∼′ y. However, notice that since (E) > 0, then
γ−1(xEy)FOSD γ−1(y), which implies that we must have γ−1(xEy) γ−1(y) by Axiom 2
(monotonicity), which implies xEy ′ y by construction of ′, contradicting xEy ∼′ y. 
Finally, notice that  is weak compact. To see why, note that we already know that
 is weak∗ compact. At the same time, we also know that every element in  is count-
ably additive: we can then apply Lemma 3 in Chateauneuf et al. (2005) to prove the
desired result. (Notice that this argument could be also derived from standard Banach
lattice techniques: as cited by Chateauneuf et al. 2005 one could follow Aliprantis and
Burkinshaw 2006, especially Section 4.2.)
Step 6. We now derive the main representation. First of all, define as Fˆ the subset
of acts in F ′ that are constant in the second component: Fˆ := {f ′ ∈ F ′ : f ′(ω [01]) =
x for some x ∈X}. Define ˆ to be the restriction of  to Fˆ . Now notice that there exists
46Recall that in this case we can define null events by saying that an event E is null if and only if φ(E)= 0
for some φ ∈.
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a convex and compact set of finitely additive probability measures  on , such that ˆ
is represented by the functional









Moreover,  is unique. Again, this trivially follows from Claim 6, where  is the projec-
tion of P on .
Notice that from Axiom 3 (continuity) and Axiom 1 (FOSD) it trivially follows that
for any p ∈ (X) there exists one x ∈ X such that δx ∼ p. Thus ce(p) is well defined
for all p ∈ (X). Now, for any act f , construct the act f¯ ∈ F as f¯ (ω) := δcf(ω) . Notice
that for any fg ∈ F , we must have f  g if and only if f¯  g¯ by Axiom 2 (monotonic-
ity). At the same time, notice that, by construction of γ, for every f ∈ F , |γ(f¯ )| = 1
and γ(f¯ )(ω [01]) = δcf(ω) . This means also that γ(f¯ ) ∈ Fˆ for all fg ∈ F . In turn, we
must have that for all fg ∈ F , f  g if and only if γ(f¯ ) ′ γ(g¯), which is equivalent to
γ(f¯ ) ˆ γ(g¯), which we know is true if and only if minπ∈
∫
 π(ω)u(γ(f¯ )(ω [01]))dω ≥
minπ∈
∫
 π(ω)u(γ(f¯ )(ω [01]))dω. At the same time, we know that for each f ∈F , we
have that γ(f¯ )(ω [01])= δcf(ω) . In turn, this means that we have









At the same time, from Claim 7, we know that for all p ∈ (X), u(cp)= V ∗(δcep)= V ∗(p),
where the first equality holds by construction of V ∗, while the second equality holds be-
cause V ∗ represents the restriction of  to (X) and because cep ∼ p for all p ∈ (X).
Given the definition of V ∗ above, therefore, we obtain that  is represented by the func-
tional


















which is the desired representation. (The uniqueness properties have been proved in
the various steps.) Finally, notice that if  satisfies Axiom 8, then we must have that ′
is such that for any f ′ g′ ∈ F ′ such that f ′ ∼′ g′ we have 12f ′ ⊕ 12g′ ∼′ f ′. But then, by
Claim 6 we have that |P| = 1, which implies || = || = 1. Moreover, since  ∈ , we
must therefore have = {}.
Step 7. We now show that, without loss of generality we can restict our attention to
decreasing, measure-preserving maps μ. In doing so, we show that the resulting set of
priors has the property of being state increasing.
Let us consider a measure-preserving function μ : (X)→ [01]X that is decreasing
(in the sense of Definition 9) and convex: i.e., for any p ∈ (X) and for any x ∈X , μ−1(x)
is convex.






′ for all p ∈ (X). Notice that the relation
B depends on both u and μ; notice, moreover, that we have φBφ′ and φ′Bφ if and only
if φ = φ′, which means that B is reflexive. Finally, notice that B is also transitive by
construction.
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Claim 10. The relation B is upper semicontinuous when B is metrized using the weak
metric. That is, for any (φm) ∈∞ andφφ′ ∈, ifφm →φ′ weakly andφmBφ for allm,
then φ′Bφ.
Proof. Suppose that we have φm, φ, and φ′ as in the statement of the claim. This
means that for any p ∈ (X) we have ∫[01] u(μ(p))dφm ≤ ∫[01] u(μ(p))dφ. Notice
moreover that, by construction of μ, there must exist x1 	 	 	  xn ∈ X and y0 	 	 	  yn ∈
[01], where y0 = 0 and yn = 1, such that μ(p)(y)= xi for all y ∈ [yi−1 yi] for i= 1 	 	 	  n.
In turn, this means that for any φ¯ ∈, we have ∫[01] u(μ(p))dφ¯=∑ni=1 u(xi)φ¯([yi−1 yi]).




i=1 u(xi)φ([yi−1 yi]). At the same
time, recall that φ′ is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure:
this means that, by the Portmanteau theorem,47 since φm → φ′ weakly, then we must
have that φm([yi−1 yi]) → φ′([yi−1 yi]) for i = 1 	 	 	  n. But this means that we have∑n
i=1 u(xi)φm([yi−1 yi]) →
∑n
i=1 u(xi)φ′([yi−1 yi]); hence,
∑n
i=1 u(xi)φ′([yi−1 yi]) ≤∑n
i=1 u(xi)φ([yi−1 yi]), so
∫
[01] u(μ(p))dφ
′ ≤ ∫[01] u(μ(p))dφ. Since this must be true
for any p ∈ (X), we therefore have φ′Bφ as sought. 
Now define the set MAX(B) := {φ ∈  : φ′ ∈  s.t. φ′Bφ and φ′ = φ}. Note that
MAX(B) =∅. This follows from noticing that since  is weak compact and B is upper
semi-continuous (in the weak metric), then standard results in order theory show that
MAX(B) =∅: see, for example, Theorem 3.2.1 in Ok (2011).


















Proof. Since by construction MAX(B) ⊆ , it trivially follows that the right hand
side of the equation is smaller than or equal to the left hand side for all p ∈ (X).
We are left to prove the converse. To this end, say by means of contradiction that
there exist some p ∈ (X) and some φˆ ∈  \ MAX(B) such that ∫[01] u(μ(p))dφˆ <
minφ∈MAX(B)
∫
[01] u(μ(p))dφ. This means that we cannot have φ
′Bφˆ for any φ′ ∈
MAX(B). Since B is transitive, we must therefore have that φˆ ∈ MAX(B), a con-
tradiction. 
Define the set ′ := {φ ∈ MAX(B) : φ ∈ arg minφ∈MAX(B)
∫
[01] u(μ(p))dφ for
some p ∈ (X)}. We now define the notion of state-increasing priors.
Definition 11. A prior φ on [01] is state-increasing if there do not exist any x1, x2, x3,
x4 such that x1 < x2 < x3 < x4, ([x1x2])= ([x3x4]), and φ([x1x2]) > φ([x3x4]).
Claim 12. Every prior φ ∈′ is state-increasing.
47See Billingsley (1995, Chapter 5).
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Proof. Suppose by means of contradiction that there exists φ′ ∈ ′ that is not state-
decreasing. This means that there exist x1, x2, x3, x4 such that x1 < x2 < x3 < x4,
([x1x2]) = ([x3x4]) and φ′([x1x2]) > φ′([x3x4]). Now notice the following. If
we have a MP-MD representation, then for any measure-preserving map μ′ : (X) →


















for all p ∈ (X), for any cep ∈ X such that δcep ∼ p. Since this must be true for ev-
ery measure-preserving μ′ and for every p, then there must exist some φˆ ∈ such that
φ′(A) = φˆ(A) for all A ⊂ [01] such that A ∩ ([x1x2] ∪ [x3x4]) = ∅, and φˆ([x1x2]) =
φ′([x3x4]) and φˆ([x3x4]) = φ′([x1x2]): the reason is that if we take a measure-
preserving map μ′ that is identical to μ except that it maps to [x3x4] whatever μ maps
to [x1x2] and vice versa, then there must exist a prior that minimizes the utility when
μ′ is used and that returns exactly the same utility. Now notice that we must have that,
by construction, φ′([x1x2]) > φ′([x3x4]) and, hence, φˆ([x1x2]) > φˆ([x3x4]), where
x1 < x2 < x3 < x4, ([x1x2])= ([x3x4]). (The two priors are otherwise the same.) But




′ for all p ∈ (X). Since φˆ = φ′, therefore, we have
that φˆBφ′, which contradicts the fact that φ′ ∈′ ⊆MAX(B). 
The above discussion implies that there exists a closed, weak compact subset ′′ of
priors on [01] such that every φ ∈′′ is state-increasing, atomless, mutually absolutely
continuous with respect to  contains , and such that  is represented by



















where μ is decreasing and u and  are defined above. To see why, simply define the set
′′ as the closed convex hull of ′. Notice that this operation maintains the property
that every φ in it is state-increasing and that it represents the preferences. Therefore,
the result follows from Claims 11 and 12.
The set ′′ above might not be unique.48 However, we will now argue that there ex-
ists a unique minimal ′′, where by minimal we understand a representation with a set
′′ such that there is no ˆ′′ ⊂ ′′ that represents the same preferences and satisfies all
the properties required. Consider any minimal representation of the form above with a
set of priors ¯′′ ⊆′′. To prove its uniqueness, assume by contradiction that there exists
48For example, if it does not already include it, one could add the identity function to the set or any
convex combination of the identity function with any member of the set, and leave the representation
unchanged.
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another minimal representation of the same preferences with a set of priors ˆ′′ = ¯′′.
Now construct the set H as the closed convex hull of ( \ ¯′′) ∪ ˆ′′.49 It is easy to see
that we must have H = , since ¯′′ = ˆ′′ and by the fact that ¯′′ is minimal. The key
observation is then to notice that (uH) is also a MP-MD representation of the same
preferences (in the sense of (2), i.e., dropping the requirement of the mappings being
decreasing). By the uniqueness of its properties we can assume that the utility function
is the same. To see why, consider first a measure-preserving map μ′ that maps worse
outcomes to higher states in [01], as the map μ defined above. For any such map, for
each lottery at least one of the minimizing priors must belong to ¯′′ in the first repre-
sentation, by construction. At the same time, the value of these acts computed using the
worst prior in ¯′′ must be equivalent to the value computed using the worst prior in ˆ′′,
because both represent the same preferences in the representation above; hence, they
must have the same certainty equivalents for each lottery. But then the minimizing pri-
ors in the second representation must belong to ˆ′′, and thus for any decreasing map,
both are representations of the same preferences.
Let us now consider a map μ′′ that is not decreasing. Notice that for any such map
in the representation of (2) we cannot have a lottery for which the minimizing prior be-
longs to ¯′′. To see why, notice that if this was the case, we could also construct a lottery
for which the minimizing prior also belongs to ¯′′ (for the map at hand), but for which
the value computed using a prior in ¯′′ is strictly lower if we used a decreasing map (as
μ′ above) instead of μ′′. The reason is that we can simply consider a lottery that is “fine
enough,” i.e., returns different outcomes with small probability, so that the fact that the
μ′′ is not nonincreasing matters. (Recall that any prior in ¯′′ assigns lower weight to
lower states, which means that by using it we obtain lower values for maps that assign
worse outcomes to higher states.) But this means that for this lottery we would obtain
a strictly lower utility when we use a map like μ′ as opposed to when we use μ′′, which
is impossible because the representation of (2) should be independent of the map used
(the certainty equivalents must be the same). This proves that for any map μ′′, we can-
not have that the unique minimizing prior belongs to ¯′′. We now turn to argue that
also for such a map two representations of the form of (2) must represent the same pref-
erences. Given our last result, the only possibility for this not to be the case is that, for
this map μ′′, there exists a lottery p for which all the minimizing priors in the second
representation belong to ˆ′′. We will now argue that this cannot be the case. If it were,
then the value of p computed using map μ′′ and a prior in ˆ′′ must be strictly below the
value of p computed using the same map and the worst prior in ( \ ¯′′). And since we
have proved that we cannot have that the unique minimizing prior for the first repre-
sentation belongs to ¯′′, then this means that the value of p computed using map μ′′
and a prior in ˆ′′ is strictly below that computed using map μ′′ and the worst prior in .
At the same time, notice that the value of p computed using the worst prior in ˆ′′ and
map μ′′ is weakly above that computed using the worst prior in ˆ′′ and a nonincreas-
ing map like μ′ above. In turn, however, we have proved that for any such map, this
must be equal to the value computed using the worst prior in ¯′′; by construction, this
49Recall that  is the set of distortions of the MP-MD representation of the same preferences.
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must be weakly higher than the value assigned by the first representation when using
map μ′. But this means that we have some p such that the value assigned by the first
representation when using map μ′ is strictly lower than the one assigned by the same
representation when using map μ′′. This contradicts the fact that a representation of
the form of (2) represents the same preferences regardless of the map, as these lotteries
would have a different certainty equivalent depending on which map we use.
(3) ⇒ (2). Consider a preference relation that admits a multiple priors and multiple
distortions representation (u). For every φ ∈  construct first the corresponding
probability density function (PDF), pdfφ. Notice that pdfφ is well defined since every
φ is mutually absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure (this follows
from the Radon–Nikodym theorem, Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 13.18). More-
over, notice that since every φ ∈ is state-increasing, then every pdfφ is a nondecreas-
ing function in [01]. Moreover, since every φ ∈  is mutually absolutely continuous
with respect to the Lebesgue measure, then pdfφ is never flat at zero. For each φ ∈ ,
construct now the corresponding cumulative distribution function and call the set of
them . Notice that every ψ ∈ must be convex, strictly decreasing, and differentiable
functions, because the corresponding PDFs exist, are nondecreasing, and never flat at
zero. We are left to show that  is pointwise compact: but this follows trivially from the
standard result that for any two distributions φ, φ′ on [01] with corresponding CDFs
ψ and ψ′ such that both are continuous on [01], we have that φ → φ′ weakly if and
only if, ψ → ψ′ pointwise.50 The desired representation then follows trivially, as does
the existence of a minimal representation. Finally, the unique properties of the minimal
representation follow trivially from the uniqueness properties of the representation in
(3), discussed above.
(2) ⇒ (1). We start by proving the necessity of Axiom 3 (continuity). For brevity in
what follows we will only prove that if  admits the representation in (3), then for any
(pn) ∈ ((X))∞ and for any pq ∈ (X), if pn  q for all n and if pn → p (in the topology
of weak convergence), then p  q. The proof for the specular case in which pn 	 q for
all n is identical, while the extension to nonconstant acts follows by standard arguments
once the convergence for constant acts is established. To avoid confusion, we denote
pn →w p to indicate weak convergence, fn →p f to denote pointwise convergence, and
→ to indicate convergence in R.
Claim 13. Considerψn ∈∞,ψ ∈,pn ∈ (X)∞, andp ∈ (X) such thatψn →p ψ and
pn →w p. Then RDUuψn(pn)→RDUuψ(p).
Proof. Consider ψn ∈ ∞, ψ ∈ , pn ∈ (X)∞, and p ∈ (X) as in the statement
of the claim. (What follows is an adaptation of the proofs in Chateauneuf 1999, Re-
mark 9 to our case.) Notice that since X is a connected and compact set, and since
u is continuous, we can assume without loss of generality (wlog) u(X) = [01]. Also,
for any t ∈ [01], define At := {x ∈ X : u(x) > t}. Then notice that for any p ∈ (X)
and ψ ∈  we have RDUuψ(p) =
∫ 1
0 ψ(p(At))dt. Define now HnH : [01] → [01] by
50This is a standard result. See, for example, the discussion in Billingsley (1995, Chapter 5).
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0 H(t)dt. Since |Hn(t)| ≤ 1 for all t ∈ [01] and for all n, then by the
dominated convergence theorem (see Aliprantis and Border 2006, Theorem 11.21), to
prove that RDUuψn(pn)→RDUuψ(p) we only need to show that Hn(t)→H(t) for al-
most all t ∈ [01]. To do this, we denote Mp := {r ∈ [01] : ∃x ∈ supp(p) such that u(x)=
r}, and we will show that we have Hn(t)→H(t) for all t ∈ [01] \Mp: since p is a simple
lottery (with therefore finite support), this will be enough.
Consider some t ∈ [01] \Mp, and notice that we must have that At is a continuity
set of p. To see why, notice that since u is continuous, At must be open, and we have
that δAt = {x ∈ X : u(x) = t}; and since t /∈ Mt , then we must have p(δAt) = 0. By the
Portmanteau theorem51 we then have pn(At)→ p(At). We will now argue that for any
such t we must also have Hn(t)→H(t), which will conclude the argument. To see why,
consider any t ∈ [01]\Mp, and notice that we must have |Hn(t)−H(t)| = |ψn(pn(At))−
ψ(p(At))| < |ψn(pn(At)) − ψn(p(At))| + |ψn(p(At)) − ψ(p(At))|. At the same time,
|ψn(pn(At))−ψn(p(At))| can be made arbitrarily small since pn(At)→ p(At) and ψn is
continuous, and |ψn(p(At))−ψ(p(At))| can be made arbitrarily small since ψn →p ψ.
But then we must have Hn(t)→H(t) as sought. 
Notice, therefore, that we can apply standard generalizations of Berge’s theorem of
the maximum, such as Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 17.13),52 and therefore
prove Axiom 3 (continuity).
Next, we turn to prove the necessity of Axiom 5 (hedging). To this end, let us define
the notion of enumeration.
Definition 12. A simple enumeration of a lottery q is a step function x : [01] → X
such that l({z ∈ [01] | f (z)=w})= q(w) ∀w ∈ supp(q).
Let N(x) ∈N be the number of steps in x, let xn be the value of f (x) at each step, and
let px(xn) be the Lebesgue measure of each step xn.
Claim 14. Let p be some lottery and let x, y be two simple enumerations of p such that
xi−1  xi for all 2≤ i≤ n. Then, if ψ is a convex RDU functional and u is a utility function







































51See Billingsley (1995, Chapter 5).
52In particular, in our case the correspondence ρ in the statement of the theorem would be constant
and equal to , which is nonempty and compact, while the function f in the statement of the theorem
would correspond to the function RDUuψ(p) seen as a function of both ψ and p, which, as we have seen,
is continuous.
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Proof. We begin by proving the claim for cases in which py maps to rational numbers;
then we extend the claim using the continuity of W . As py(yi) is rational, for all i ∈
1 	 	 	 N(y), we can write each py(yi)=mi/ni for some set of integers {mi} and {ni}. This
means that there is a set of natural numbers {ki} such that py(yi)= ki/∏ni. Notice that
we can rewrite the step function y as a different step function y¯ defined by the intervals
{[j/∏ni (j+1)/∏ni)}∏ni−1j=0 , where the value of the function in the interval [j/∏ni (j+
1)/
∏
ni) is equal to the value of y in the interval [py(yl)py(ym)), where l =max{t ∈ N |
py(yt)≤ j/∏ni} and min{t ∈N | py(yt)≥ (j + 1)/∏ni}. In other words, we have split the
original step function y into a finite number of equally spaced steps, while preserving
the value of the original function (again we can do this because the original function had
steps defined by rational numbers). We can therefore now think of y¯ as consisting of a
finite number of elements of equal length that can be interchanged using the procedure
we discuss below. Note that redefining y in this way does not change the function, i.e.,
y(t)= y¯(t) ∀t, and neither does it affect its utility, i.e., W (y)=W (y¯).
Now order the steps of y¯ using , breaking ties arbitrarily: let y¯1 denote the best
step of y¯, let y¯2 denote the next best element, and so on. We next define a sequence of
enumerations and functions recursively:
(i) Let 1y¯ = y¯. Define the function 1r : {1 	 	 	 N(y)} →N such that 1r(j) is the original
position of y¯j for all j (i.e., 1r(j)= {n ∈N | 1y¯ir(j) = y¯j}).
(ii) Define iy¯ as iy¯(t) = y¯i for t ∈ [(i − 1)/∏ni i/∏ni), define iy¯(t) = i−1y¯i for t ∈
[(i−1r(i)− 1)/∏ni i−1r(i)/∏ni), and define iy¯(t)= i=1y¯(t) otherwise.
(iii) Define ir(j) as the position of yj in iy¯ for all j (i.e., ir(j)= {n ∈N | iy¯ir(j) = y¯j}).
So, at each stage, this procedure takes the previous function, looks for the ith best
step of y¯, and switches it into the ith position in the enumeration (while moving what-
ever was in that slot back to where the best element came from). The function ir keeps
track of the location of each of the steps of y¯ in each iteration i. The first thing to note
is that the final element in this sequence,
∏
ni y¯, is equivalent to x, in the sense that
W (x) = W (
∏
ni y¯): clearly, each of these switches preserves the Lesbegue measure as-
sociated to each prize; thus,
∏





for all i by construction, meaning that u(
∏
ni y¯(t))= u(x(t)) for all t.
Next we show that W (iy)≤W (i−1y) for all i ∈ {2 	 	 	 ∏ni} First note that it must be
the case that i−1y¯i 	 y¯i: in words, the ith best element of y¯ must be weakly better than
whatever is in the ith slot in i−1y¯. To see this, note that if this were not the case, then it
must be the case that i−1y¯i = y¯j for some j < i. But, by the iterative procedure, y¯j must
be in slot i−1y¯j = i−1y¯i. Next note that it must be the case that i−1r(i)≥ i. By the iterative
procedure, for all j < i, i−1y¯j = y¯j = y¯i. Thus, as i−1r(i) is the location of y¯i in i−1y¯j , it
must be the case that i−1r(i)≥ i.
Next note that iy and i−1y differ only on the intervals [(i − 1)/∏ni i/∏ni) and
[(i−1r(i) − 1)/∏ni i−1r(i)/∏ni). Thus, we can write the difference between W (iy)





































Now, as i−1y¯i 	 y¯i, it must be the case that u(i−1y¯i) ≤ u(y¯i), and so (u(i−1y¯i) −
u(y¯i)) ≤ 0. Furthermore, it must be the case that the term in the first parentheses is
also weakly negative by the convexity of ψ. To see this, define the function ψ¯(x) =
ψ(x+(i−1)/∏ni)−ψ((i−1)/∏ni). This is a convex function with ψ¯≥ 0 and so it is sub-
additive. This means that we have ψ¯(i−1r(i)/
∏
ni−(i−1)/∏ni)≥ ψ¯((i−1r(i)−1)/∏ni−
(i− 1)/∏ni)+ ψ¯((i−1r(i)/∏ni − (i− 1)/∏ni)− ((i−1r(i)− 1)/∏ni − (i− 1)/∏ni)). In
turn, this is equal to ψ¯((i−1r(i)− 1)/∏ni − (i− 1)/∏ni)+ ψ¯(1/∏ni). If we then substi-
tute the original function, we get ψ(i−1r(i)/
∏
ni)≥ψ((i−1r(i)− 1)/∏ni)+ψ(i/∏ni)−
ψ((i− 1)/∏ni). Thus, by iteration we have W (y)=W (y¯)=W (1y¯)≥W (∏ni y¯(t))=W (x)
and we are done.
To extend the proof to enumerations with irrationalp functions, take such a function
y and associated x that is the rank order enumeration of y, whereby py(yi) is not guaran-
teed to be rational for all i ∈ 1 	 	 	 N(y). Now note that py is a vector in RN(y). Note that
we can construct a sequence of vectors qi ∈ QN(y) such that {qi} → py . Define the sim-
ple enumeration yi as the step function whereby yi(t)= yn for t ∈ [∑n−1j=0 qii−1∑nj=0 qii−1).










As qij → py(yj) and as ψ is continuous, then it must be the case that W (yi)→W (y).
Similarly, if we let xi be the rank enumeration of yi, then it must be the case thatW (xi)→
W (x). Thus, if it were the case that W (y) > W (x), then there would be some i such that
W (yi) >W (xi). But as yi is rational, this contradicts the above result. 
We now turn to prove that Axiom 5 is satisfied. Again we will prove this only
for degenerate acts, the extension to the general case being trivial. Let p and q be
two lotteries such that p ∼ q and r ∈ p ⊕ q. Let x be the enumeration of r. Then
there must be two enumerations zx and zy such that (i) zi = 12zxi ⊕ 12zyi for all i,
and (ii) for every xi,
∑
i|zxi =xi r(zi) = p(xi) and
∑
i|zyi =yi r(zi) = p(yi). Now, the util-









i )+ u(zyi ))), which is, in turn,
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Note that the enumerations are not in rank order, but by Claim 14, reordering can
only decrease the utility of the enumeration by shuffling them into the rank order for
every π ∈ . Let z¯x and z¯y be the rank order enumerations of zx. We must then have












j=0 r(zj)) − π(
∑i
j=0 r(zj)))u(zy)). This is larger than or equal to






j=0 r(zj)) − π(
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i )), which is then equal to
1
2U(p)+ 12U(q) as sought.
We now turn to Axiom 1 (FOSD). Let π be a continuous RDU functional. We know
(e.g., Wakker 1994, Theorem 12) that it respects FOSD. Thus, suppose that p first order
stochastically dominates q and let π∗ ∈  be the functional that minimizes the utility
of p. We know that the utility of q under this functional has to be lower than the utility
of p; thus, the utility of q (which is assessed under the functional that minimizes the
utility of q) is lower than that of p.
Finally, Axiom 2 (monotonicity), Axiom 4 (objective trade-off consistency), and Ax-
iom 6 (degenerate independence) follow from standard arguments. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Notice first of all that ⊕1 = ⊕2 holds if and only if u1 is
a positive affine transformation of u2. Also, define by V1 and V2 the functionals corre-
sponding to the minimal MP-MW representations of 1 and 2, respectively.
(1) ⇒ (2). Suppose now that we have that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1.
Since ⊕1 = ⊕2 , then u1 is a positive affine transformation of u2 and let us assume
first that u1 = u2. Now consider p ∈ (X) and x1x2 ∈ X such that p ∼1 δx1 and p ∼2
δx2 . Notice that since 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1, then δx1 1 δx2 ; thus,







We will now argue that this implies 1 ⊆ 2. Suppose not, i.e., that there exists ψ′ ∈






violating the uniqueness properties of the minimal MP-MW representation.
Similarly, consider f ∈ F such that f (ω) = δx for some x ∈ X . Consider x′1x′2 ∈ X
such that f ∼1 δx′1 and f ∼2 δx′2 . Notice that since 2 is more attracted to certainty than1, then δx′1 1 δx′2 ; thus, u1(x′1)≥ u1(x′2). Thus, we must have V1(f )= u1(x′1)≥ u1(x′2)=
u2(x
′















We will now argue that this implies 1 ⊆ 2. Suppose not, i.e., that there exists π ′ ∈















violating the uniqueness properties of the minimal MP-MW representation.
This proves one direction, assuming u1 = u2. It is straightforward to extend the proof
to the case in which u1 is a positive affine transformation of u2.
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(2) ⇒ (1) Suppose that u1 is a positive affine transformation of u2, i.e., there exist
ab ∈ R, a > 0, such that u2 = au1 + b, and 1 ⊆ 2, 1 ⊆ 2. Now notice that for all f
we must have

















)= aV1(f )+ b	
At the same time, we have that V2(δx)= u2(x)= au1(x)+b= aV1(δx)+b. Thus, we must
have that 2 is more attracted to certainty than 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider a preference relation  that satisfies Axioms 1–3
as well as Axiom 7. By the latter, there must exist π ∈ () such that fπ  f for all f ∈F .
Now define an by
pan q ⇔ p q (3)
for all pq ∈ (X), and by
fπ ∼ f
for all f ∈ F . By Axioms 1–3, this preference is well defined, and it is ambiguity neu-
tral by construction. Now consider p ∈ (X) and f ∈ F such that p an (an)f . Then
notice that by construction we must have f ∼an fπ ; hence, p an (an)fπ . By (3), we
must therefore have p ()fπ . But we know that, by Axiom 7, fπ  f ; hence, p ()f ,
proving that  is ambiguity averse.
Conversely, consider a preference relation  that satisfies Axioms 1–3 and that is
ambiguity averse. Then there must exists an that is ambiguity neutral and such that 
is more ambiguity averse than an. Since an is ambiguity neutral, then there must exist
some π ∈ () such that fπ ∼an f for all f ∈ F . Since  is more ambiguity averse than
an, then fπ ∼an f implies fπ  f . Since this holds for all f ∈F ,  satisfies Axiom 7. 
Proof of Theorem 2. (1) ⇒ (2). Consider a preference relation that admits a multiple
priors–multiple weighting representation (u) and suppose that it satisfies Axiom 7.
Then there must exist some π ∈ () such that fπ  f for all f ∈F . We will now prove
that  ⊇ (π). Suppose this is not the case: there exists a prior π ′ on () such that
π¯ ∈ (π) and π¯ /∈ . Then there must exist some f ∈ F such that ∑ π¯(ω)U(f (ω)) <
minπ′∈
∑
π ′(ω)U(f (ω)); otherwise the multiple priors–multiple weighting represen-
tation (u ∪ {π¯}) would represent the same preferences, violating the uniqueness
properties of the representation. Notice also that since all probability weightings ψ ∈
are convex, we must also have that RDUuψ(fπ)=minl∈L
∑
γψl(π)(ω)U(f (ω)); thus,






















)= V (f )	
Thus, fπ ≺ f , contradicting Axiom 7.
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(2) ⇒ (1). Consider a preference relation that admits a multiple priors–multiple
weighting representation (u) such that  ⊇ (π) for some π ∈ . We will now
prove fπ  f for all f ∈ F . Consider f ∈ F and any enumeration l ∈ L such that
f (l−1(i− 1)) f (l−1(i)) for i= 2 	 	 	  ||. Notice that by definition of γψl we must have
RDUuψ(fπ)=∑γψl(π)(ω)U(f (ω)). Thus,






















)= V (f )	
Thus, fπ  f . 
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